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I. Introduction
Criminal trial practice in South Carolina is shaped by one over-
arching reality: the State's elected prosecutors have complete and exclusive
statutory authority to determine what cases are called to trial or for a plea
and in front of what judges.' The ramifications of this single structural
feature are legion: Lawyers and witnesses often have little real notice as to
when and whether cases will be called for trial. Incarcerated defendants
who might otherwise exercise their right to a jury trial routinely plead guilty
instead of waiting in jail until the solicitor 2 deigns to bring their cases to a
1. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-7-330 (2004) ("Preparation of the dockets for general sessions courts
shall be exclusively vested in the circuit solicitor and the solicitor shall determine the order in which
cases on the docket are called for trial. Provided, however, that no later than seven days prior to the
beginning of each term of general sessions court, the solicitor in each circuit shall prepare and publish a
docket setting forth the cases to be called for trial during the term."). In South Carolina, the "general
sessions courts" are county courts that have primary jurisdiction to adjudicate felony and serious
misdemeanor cases. Less serious cases are adjudicated (at least in the first instance) in local magistrate
and municipal courts. No statute governs control of the docket in these local courts and experience
indicates that scheduling practices vary from judge to judge. When this article discusses criminal court
docketing practices in South Carolina, its observations and conclusions should be understood to apply
only to cases brought in general sessions court.
It should be noted that a little-cited provision of South Carolina law allows a defendant to seek
"immediate disposition" of her case through a plea of guilty. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-23-120 to -150
(2004). However, since the provision is by its terms only applicable when the prosecutor assents, see §
17-23-130, its only consequence is to free prosecutors from the need to obtain a grand jury indictment
before accepting a guilty plea.
2. In South Carolina, local, State-level prosecutors are called "solicitors." See S.C. CODE ANN.
§1-7-310 (2004) (introducing office of "solicitor"); S.C. CODE ANN. §1-7-320 (2004) (defining
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court's attention. Illegally obtained evidence is rarely challenged, because
no judge has the authority to entertain a motion to exclude such evidence
(or to dismiss the case for lack of sufficient evidence) until the morning of
trial.3 Clients free on bond must continuously rearrange their lives to make
court appearances called by solicitors for no purpose other than to ascertain
the defendant's continuing availability.
Though this institutional arrangement was once fairly common,
4
South Carolina is now the only state in the union that formally reserves to
its prosecutors the exclusive authority to set the criminal court docket.5
Knowledge that South Carolina continues to structure its criminal justice
system in this way rarely seeps across the State's borders.6 Indeed, if one
solicitor's duties to include "prosecutions"). This article treats "solicitor" and "prosecutor" as synonyms
unless otherwise indicated. In a similar vein, unless otherwise indicated, all references to a court's
"calendar" and its "docket" should be read as interchangeable.
3. See, e.g., State v. Needs, 508 S.E.2d 857, 863 (S.C. 1998) (holding that trial court generally has
no power to dismiss a properly drawn indictment before trial); State v. Ridge, 236 S.E.2d 401,402 (S.C.
1977) (holding that before the jury is impaneled decision to drop prosecution is "within the discretion of
the solicitor" and that "the trial judge may not direct or prevent [dismissals] at that time"); State v.
Charles, 190 S.E. 466, 468 (S.C. 1937) (holding similarly).
4. For a discussion of the history of prosecutorial control of the docket in South Carolina and
elsewhere, see infra Part II.
5. See. infra Part I.A.5. The laws and rules of some states are silent on how criminal court
dockets are set, leaving decisions on docketing procedures to judicial discretion and local custom. It
appears that in some localities in those states (as well as perhaps in some states that ostensibly vest
docket control in the court) judges largely defer to prosecutors in setting the court calendar. See, e.g.,
Bishop v. State, 482 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (concluding, after reviewing local
traditions and practices as well as relevant statutes and court decisions, that system whereby one
county's court allocates bulk of authority to prosecutors to set court calendars while retaining
supervisory power is permissible because it is "not improper for the prosecuting attorney to have input
into the positioning of cases on the criminal trial docket"). Moreover, in a handful of states where
prosecutors once controlled the docket, reform has been only partial, stripping the prosecutors of the
ultimate authority to force or prohibit cases from going to trial but allowing them to retain significant
subsidiary involvement in the management of the docket. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-49.4 (2005)
(codifying 1999 compromise in which cases continue to be "calendared" by prosecutors but which
require prosecutors to exercise their discretion according to a "docketing plan" approved by the judges
in the district after consultation with the defense bar); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § I (West 1998)
(giving prosecutors the authority to "make and deposit with the clerk ... a list of all cases to be tried,"
but permitting judges to alter the order of the list by order "for cause shown" and, as amended in 1974,
allowing judges to add cases to the list "on its own motion" or on the motion "of the defendant"); cf
Commonwealth v. Dixon, 441 A.2d 1305, 1307 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) ("Although the trial court is
ultimately responsible for the proper management of the criminal calendar, the prosecutor and the Court
administrator share such responsibility, at least in the first instance."). Though Dixon is cited as
significant authority in two major legal encyclopedia, see infra note 7, it is an unreasoned decision from
a state trial court that relies on out-of-context quotations from other trial court opinions and has never
itself been cited by another court. I am skeptical as to whether it accurately represents the state of the
law on docket control in Pennsylvania in 1982, let alone 2005. For more on the developments in these
and other states, see infra Part II.
6. See, e.g., John Rubin, 1999 Legislation Affecting Criminal Law and Procedure, Administration
of Justice No. 99-05 at 9-10 (1999), available at http://www.ncinfo.iog.unc.edu/programs/
crimlaw/aoj9905crimlegislation.pdf (explaining a compromise that ended complete prosecutorial docket
control in North Carolina and reporting erroneously that "[u]nique among the fifty state, North Carolina
has allowed prosecutors control over the calendaring of felony cases"); Telephone Interview with Brian
Ostrom, Principal Court Research Consultant, National Center for State Courts, (January 8, 2005) (one
of the nation's foremost authorities on the case management systems of state courts commenting that "I
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consults the relevant literature, awareness that this was once a common
practice or that it is even a theoretical option for structuring a criminal
justice system is gradually slipping from our collective professional
consciousness.7 More significantly, contemporary sources have long since
abandoned even the threadbare discussion of the policy consequences of
prosecutorial calendar control that once spotted treatises and law reviews.
8
When first exposed to the persistence of prosecutorial docket
control in South Carolina, outside observers tend to leap to two related
conclusions. First, most assume that the system is unconstitutional under
existing caselaw or through relatively uncontroversial extrapolation from
that caselaw. Second, most express puzzlement at why such a system has
persisted in South Carolina given its underlying constitutional vulnerability.
This puzzlement often manifests itself as shock or outrage at the fact that
South Carolina's criminal defense and civil rights bars have not mounted a
concerted constitutional challenge to the docketing system.9
never knew that South Carolina did it that way. We always talk about the degree to which courts need
to be convinced to aggressively manage their own dockets. I always wondered in the back of my mind
whether there were some states that imposed legal constraints on the courts' authority but I didn't know
of any.").
7. Conscientious review of the last quarter-century of law review literature and the current
editions of the standard criminal law and procedure textbooks and treatises has uncovered no mention of
the history or constitutional status of the various possible docket control regimes. A few treatises
mention in passing the fact that judges normally control the docket. A typical example is CHARLES E.
TORCIA, 3 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 377, at 483 (13th ed. 1991) ("[T]he trial judge
ordinarily has the discretionary power to determine the order in which cases will be called on its trial list
and to call a case out of order.") The major legal encyclopedia mention the issue in passing, stating that
courts have ultimate control over there own dockets but noting a division of authority on the question
whether it is proper for prosecutors to have any input at all in structuring the docket. See 23A C.J.S.
Criminal Law § 1144 (1989); 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 77 (1991). Interestingly, these (largely identical)
articles rest their assessment of a conflict on only two authorities, the unreasoned and unfollowed
Pennsylvania trial court decision, Commonwealth v. Dixon, 441 A2d 1305, 1307 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982),
discussed supra note 5, and Bishop v. State, 482 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985), also
discussed supra note 5.
One interesting example of the degree to which the issue has slipped off of our professional radar
screen is the 2002 decision of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to
remove from the Rules a sentence guaranteeing federal district judges the right to maintain their own
dockets on the grounds that "[t]he Committee believed that the sentence simply stated a truism and was
no longer necessary." Fed. R. Crim. P. 50 advisory committee's notes on 2002 amendments. The
nation's leading experts on criminal procedure could literally not fathom the existence of an alternative
docketing scheme despite the continued vitality of such a system in, at minimum, South Carolina.
8. See, e.g., LESTER BERNHARDT ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL
383-84 (1947); Edward W. Furia, The Right of the District Attorney to Prepare the Criminal Calendar,
26 TEMP. L. Q. 128, 131 (1952); Note, Calendar Practice in Criminal Courts-Control By Court or
Prosecutor?, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 613 (1948) (hereafter "Columbia Note"); Note, Prosecutor's
Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 1057, 1072-75 (hereafter "Pennsylvania Note") (containing section
entitled "Control of the Criminal Calendar"); Note, A Novel System of Criminal Court Calendar
Practice, 35 CORNELL L. Q. 349 (1950) (hereafter "Cornell Note").
9. These reactions are abstracted from conversations this author had with about a dozen academics
and practitioners with expertise in criminal law and procedure and/or constitutional law between July
2002 and January 2005. The specific formulation of these ideas is my attempt to express their common
reaction rather than an accurate transcription of any one individual's words. It is likely that some (but
not all) of the people with whom I conversed would have framed these thoughts differently or would
want to shade or qualify them before signing on to them.
When Prosecutors Control Criminal Court Dockets
Using the frequent puzzlement of such outsiders as a jumping off
point, this article interrogates the institution of solicitorial control of the
docket as it is practiced in South Carolina. The article proceeds in three
parts, each of which attempts to make a contribution to a different scholarly
discussion. In Part II, I explore the history of criminal court docket control
both in South Carolina and nationally, uncovering a fascinating, yet, until
now, largely ignored, thread in the history of American criminal procedure.
In Part III, I examine some of the many ways in which prosecutorial control
of the docket has the potential to cause or encourage wrongful convictions.
Finally, in Part IV, I attempt to explain why South Carolina lawyers have
not made a substantial effort to uproot solicitorial control of the docket
despite its increasingly anomalous and doctrinally tenuous status. Among
other tasks, I attempt to distill some general lessons about the value and
limitations of systemic reform litigation from the perspective of a campaign
unwaged, a battle not fought.
Though this article draws its lessons from South Carolina's now-
anomalous system of complete prosecutorial control, its implications reach
well beyond the State's borders in several significant ways. First, the
article uncovers a national historical narrative that, in addition to its
intrinsic value, also serves to illuminate the events and values underlying a
core aspect of each state's dispute resolution rules. Though occasionally
esoteric, the historical argument at the heart of Part II provides a wealth of
data to litigators and judges charged with interpreting each state's criminal
docketing rules and administering criminal justice in conformity with
legislative intent and constitutional guarantees.
Second, Part IV of this article represents a unique intervention in
the ongoing theoretical debate about the wisdom and efficacy of systemic
reform litigation. Most writing on systemic reform litigation focuses on
cases filed and fully litigated-narrating successes,' 0 explaining failures, | l
and differentiating between the two.' 2 This article, by contrast, focuses on a
litigation campaign that, despite its conceptual promise, has not yet been
waged. In endeavoring to explain why such a campaign has not been
waged, this article identifies-and discusses at a broad level of generality-
10. For classic examples, see the first generation of writing on the legal campaign against
segregation, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975) (narrating in great detail and
with great reverence the path of the litigation in Brown and its sister cases).
11. The literature on the so-close and yet-so-far battle to abolish capital punishment through
constitutional litigation constitutes one such collective post-mortem. For one recent take on that
episode, see Austin Sarat, Recapturing the Spirit of Furman: The American Bar Association and the
New Abolitionist Politics, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1998).
12. For two examples among many, see, for example, MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW
TO CIVIL RIGHTS (2004) (arguing, in step with a sizable cadre of other revisionists, that the NAACP's
legal campaign against public school segregation should not, in the end, be treated as a major victory);
MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING IN THE MODERN STATE: HOW
THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS (1998) (arguing, against conventional wisdom, that the
institutional reform litigation resulting in court management of many of America's prisons was a
success).
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a number of factors that have the potential to defeat or undercut the
effectiveness of a seemingly promising litigation campaign. The potential
roadblocks posited in this Part serve as a mild caution for those who might
otherwise jump headlong into impact litigation and as a checklist of issues
to consider for those who choose to move forward with such litigation.
Most importantly, Part III of this article offers a thorough and
careful-albeit anecdotal-catalog of the primary threats to justice and
efficiency posed by South Carolina's now-unique system of complete
prosecutorial docket control. While this section undoubtedly makes some
specific policy observations whose relevance is limited to South Carolina
(and perhaps the handful of other states where prosecutors retain primary
authority for the management of criminal court dockets13), its over-arching
theme is of vital importance to legislators, judges, and litigants across the
nation. Though the big battles over the structural rules of docket control are
dormant in all but a few states, interstitial questions of docket control
authority are debated and decided everyday in jurisdictions across the
country. When legislators design criminal justice structures and tinker with
procedural rules, when overworked courts adopt administrative rules for
speeding their dockets or divvying their cases, when defense lawyers and
prosecutors meet with judges in scheduling conferences, their
determinations have great consequence for the quality and character of
criminal justice. What South Carolina's experience suggests is that our
nation will be better served if we firmly and forthrightly accept and act
upon the proposition that fair and impartial justice cannot be guaranteed if
administrative control of the courtroom is vested in a party-litigant.
II. Prosecutorial Docket Control in Historical Perspective
The decision as to who has the authority to bring a matter up for
resolution before the relevant tribunal is one of the most basic decisions a
system of adjudication must make. Despite-or perhaps because of-the
elemental nature of this structural matter, historical treatments of the
American criminal justice system have thus far offered a startling paucity of
evidence as to how docket control power has been allocated at different
times and in different places. 14  In the absence of a clear historical
13. See discussion supra note 5 (citing examples of North Carolina and Massachusetts).
14. I have been unable to locate a single academic article by either a historian or a legal scholar
that is focused on this subject. General works of history fare no better. The leading one-volume work
on the history of American Criminal Justice does not mention docket control. See (or rather don't see)
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1994). Nor do most of
the other standard reference works on the history of criminal justice, for example., HERBERT A.
JOHNSON & NANCY TRAVIS WOLFE, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (3d ed. 2003); ERIC H.
MONKKONEN, ed., CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICAN HISTORY: THE COLONIES AND EARLY REPUBLIC
(1992) (collecting major essays on early American criminal justice); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND
JUSTICE (2d ed. 2002), or, with one exception, the leading case studies of American criminal practice,
for example, GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN
AMERICA (2003); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW, THE IMPACT OF
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explanation of how and when the great majority of American states moved
away from prosecutorial docket control (and of a concomitant explanation
as to why and how South Carolina has remained resistant), it is difficult to
assess whether and to what extent South Carolina's unique system is in
tension with our collective constitutional understandings and public policy
norms.
Drawing primarily on secondary sources, appellate decisions, and
statutes, this Part attempts to fill the historical gap, providing a provisional
narrative of the history of docket control practices in the United States,
primarily in the post-World War II era.15  In addition-and in stark
contrast-this Part also provides a narrative of the political and legal
developments that entrenched prosecutorial docket control in South
Carolina during the same era in which that practice was withering or being
uprooted in the remainder of the nation.
A. The National Story
1. The (Hazy) Early Chapters
The early history of criminal docket control procedures is hazy at
best.16 It appears that some colonies granted a public prosecutor the power
LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (1975); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN &
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY,
CALIFORNIA 1870-1910 (1981). The one significant exception is ALLEN STEINBERG, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PHILADELPHIA 1800-1880 (1989), which narrates in great
detail the way in which cases were called in Philadelphia's lower level criminal courts and mentions
several times the mechanisms for calling cases utilized in that city's felony courts.
The paucity of historical evidence is particularly striking given the voluminous literature that has
developed over the historical development of other structural features of our criminal justice system,
such as the growth of plea-bargaining or the decline in the role of the jury. On the former, see, e.g.,
FISHER, supra, at 6-11 (narrating the "three waves" of scholarship on the history of plea bargaining in
America). On the latter, see, e.g., two classic sources, Nelson, supra, at 21 (noting that early in
American history juries "had vast power to find both law and facts") and Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries
as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582, 590-96 (1939) (discussing nineteenth-century cases
in which juries decided questions of law), and two more recent works, George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as
Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 667-73 (1997) and Renee B. Lettow, New Trial for Verdict Against
Law: Judge-Jury Relations in Early Nineteenth-Century America, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505 (1996).
The shifting balance of power between judges and lawyers in the nineteenth century has been the subject
of some interesting recent historical scholarship, though none of it mentions the issue of docket control.
For one insightful example of this new scholarship, see Renee Lettow Lemer, The Transformation of the
American Civil Trial: The Silent Judge, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 195 (2000)
15. This narrative is not meant to be definitive. To the contrary, I hope this article encourages
other historians to examine the relevant court records and other primary sources in order to uncover a
richer and fuller history of docket control procedures. If and when such studies are completed, I expect
that they will modify my narrative and identify some inaccuracies in my story. I am cautiously
optimistic, however, that the basic structure of the story detailed in the next few pages will stand the
tests of time and professional contestation.
16. Much of this haze is due to the lack of readily available source material. Some of it, however,
also turns on the anachronism of my research question. To speak of a "docket" whose control must be
allocated to some party or a local "prosecutor" as someone who might be vested with such control is to
assume the existence of concepts and roles that were themselves emerging-often hesitantly and
unevenly-across the United States during the time period in question. On the history of public
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to determine when and whether cases were called before a judge-along
with the ancillary duty to provide notice-as early as the middle of the
Eighteenth Century.' 7  In most colonies, however, the process for calling
cases was more informal and judge-driven. Small-scale or low-stakes
criminal prosecutions were often resolved on the spot by Judges or Justices
of the Peace applying a system of rough natural justice.' 8  More serious
cases usually required a more formal process (including, in many cases, a
grand jury indictment and/or a jury trial) and multiple court dates. Even in
those cases, however, criminal matters seem to have moved towards
resolution through a largely informal process, whereby judges,
complainants (or prosecutors), and defendants all had significant say in
prosecutors in the United States, the standard source is Abraham S. Goldstein, Prosecution: History of
the Public Prosecutor, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 1242-46 (explaining
that public prosecutors of some stripe had emerged in most of the United States by the turn of the
nineteenth century, but that the shift towards popular elections as the primary means for filling those
offices and the conceptualization of prosecutors as executive officials rather than judicial administrators
were largely developments of the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries). For a fuller treatment that
touches tangentially on the issues raised in this piece, see Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power
of "Public" Prosecutors in Historical Perspective, 39 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 1309 (2002). It should be
noted that the development of public prosecution did not mean the immediate or even the rapid end of
private prosecutions. See, e.g., STEINBERG, supra note 14 (narrating the coexistence of public and
private prosecution in nineteenth-century Philadelphia). On the failure of one state to maintain a
criminal court docket well into the twentieth century, see Hugh N. Fuller, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
VIRGINIA 8 (1931) (noting absence of central docketing records in Virginia, circa 1930); cf id. at 145
(recommending adoption of a formal docketing system).
To further complicate the issue, in most jurisdictions, criminal cases were brought (and continue to
be brought) in a variety of different fora with strikingly different rules, procedures, and players. See,
e.g., FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 14, at 39 (explaining that criminal cases in nineteenth century
California were divided between a "Superior Court" and "justices' courts or police courts"); STEINBERG,
supra note 14 (describing nineteenth century criminal trial practice in Philadelphia and emphasizing the
differences between cases resolved in front of Alderman serving as Justices of the Peace and cases sent
along for further proceedings in the "courts of record"); Donna J. Spidel and Stuart W. Thomas, Jr.,
Crime and Society in North Carolina, 1663-1740, in 2 MONKKONEN, supra note 14, at 699, 700-701
(describing division of labor in colonial North Carolina between a "General Court" and "precinct" or
"county" courts). To ask what the calendaring processes were in a given jurisdiction at a particular time
often requires either a bi- or tri-furcated answer or a false synthesis of divergent procedures. Unless
otherwise indicated, my discussion of calendaring practice in a given state refers to the practice in that
state's general felony trial court. Cf note 1 supra (limiting my discussion of contemporary South
Carolina to such a court).
17. See, e.g., Columbia Note, supra note 8, at 615 (examining historical evidence and concluding
that, in New York, "[g]eneral power in the prosecutor to control the criminal calendar probably had its
origin in colonial days"). It is worth noting, however, that Carolyn Ramsey's more recent and more
thorough discussion of the role of public prosecutors in New York during this period cautions against
reliance on some of the sources from which the Columbia Note appears to draw its information. See
Ramsey, supra note 16, at 1324-27.
18. The scope of the power of magistrates and justices of the peace is a recurrent theme in the
history of practically every colony. See, e.g., STEINBERG, supra note 14, at 37-55 (describing, in a
chapter entitled "The Aldermen and Primary Justice," the central role of Philadelphia's aldermen in
adjudicating cases and administering the city's criminal justice system, usually through one-shot
appearances); NELSON, supra note 14, at 15 (sketching out the substantial jurisdiction of Justices of the
Peace both individually and as a collective court in colonial Massachusetts); see generally LAWRENCE
M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1985) 286 (concluding that during the late
colonial and early national periods, "[m]ost offenders, and almost everybody charged with petty crimes,
were dealt with in a great rush, and quite summarily").
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when and how cases were disposed of.19 Docketing practices appear to
have varied greatly across regions and jurisdictions; one factor that likely
colored the local variation was the relative power and assertiveness of the
bench and the bar.2°
In many jurisdictions, the Nineteenth Century saw a consolidation
of de facto (and, at times, de jure) calendar control in the hands of public
prosecutors. A number of factors appear to have contributed to this trend.
First, as procedures became more formalized and governmental functions
more organized, a larger percentage of cases required multiple court
appearances, which, in turn, increasingly required courts to "manage" their
caseload in order to keep track of cases and to assure the presence of all
relevant parties. In an era without large court staffs, the prosecutor was a
readily available and appropriately qualified individual on whom to devolve
this responsibility. Second, as the volume of criminal prosecutions
increased and as judges became more likely to order defendants jailed
pretrial, the number of defendants who needed to be produced from custody
for criminal court proceedings grew unwieldy. In some localities, it was
likely prosecutors' ability to coordinate the appearance of pretrial detainees
that earned them the privilege and chore of determining the order in which
the court would hear cases.2 1
Finally, the rise of prosecutorial control of the docket in the
Nineteenth Century may have been the result of the prevalence of "circuit
riding," the practice whereby judges traveled long distances from county to
county or town to town to hear cases for a day or a week, only to ride off
into the sunset (often accompanied by much of the private bar) when the
docket was dry or the term of court was over.22 In a world where criminal
19. See, e.g., STEINBERG, supra note 14, at 57 (describing Philadelphia's venue for the trial of
more serious cases, The Courts of Record, as facing a "complex caseload" that required "a day-to-day
struggle" between "court officials" and litigants over "seemingly simple matters of criminal procedure
such as whether to prosecute, when to hear a case, whether and when to discontinue a case, and what to
consider in arriving at a sentence"); see also id. at 59, 64, 70, 184 (illustrating, in various ways, that
"day-to-day struggle" with regard to the court calendar); cf Douglass Greenberg, Crime, Law
Enforcement, and Social Control in America, in 1 MONKKONEN, supra note 14, at 231, 250-52
(describing system of ensuring defendants' appearances in colonial South Carolina as haphazard and
often unsuccessful for reasons that ranged from inability to fill criminal justice positions, to colony's
unwillingness to pay for a functioning jail, to "the general disregard of South Carolinians for the law").
20. Cf Lettow Lerner, supra note 14, passim (explaining regional pattern in which judges lost the
power to comment on the evidence in many states in the nineteenth century South and West as the result
of a regional legal culture in which judges were disrespected by lawyers and lawyers often had more
political power than judges).
21. See, e.g., STEINBERG, supra note 14, at 70 (noting power of district attorneys to schedule date
on which cases ofjailed defendants would be adjudicated).
22. Much of the literature on circuit-riding deals with the much contested but long-lasting practice
whereby United States Supreme Court Justices were required to ride circuit over several states, handling
cases at both the trial and intermediate appellate levels. See, e.g, 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 85-90 (1922); Wythe Holt, The Federal Courts Have Enemies in All
Who Fear Their Influence on State Objects: The Failure to Abolish Supreme Court Circuit-Riding in the
Judiciary Acts of 1792 and 1793, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 301 (1987); Joshua Glick, On the Road: The
Supreme Court and the History of Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1753 (2003).
While the insights provided by those sources tell us something about what it was like to be part of a
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court judges were likely to be over-worked and over-tired outsiders who
rode into town a few times a year for short sittings, there were strong
advantages to having an official with knowledge of the local scene ready
with a list of cases when a judge arrived. While the sources on this point
have proven particularly illusive, it is likely that the practice of vesting
either legal or practical authority for docket management in local
prosecutors gained a toehold in many jurisdictions during the Nineteenth
Century as a practical response to the realities of circuit riding.
There is no systematic record as to how many localities ever
accorded the prosecutor formal control over court calendars.2 3 The
available evidence seems to suggest that, in the late Nineteenth and early
Twentieth Centuries, prosecutorial control was an almost universal system
in much of the South,24 a surprisingly common practice in the Northeast,
25
traveling legal circus, the experiences of the United States Supreme Court are, here like elsewhere,
unrepresentative of the rest of the judiciary. The historical literature on circuit-riding among state-court
judges and attorneys reveals a rougher-hewn, more ad hoc legal culture. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra
note 14, at 140-41, 308-10 (describing the life of a circuit riding judge or lawyer); DANIEL H. CALHOUN,
PROFESSIONAL LIVES IN AMERICA: STRUCTURE AND ASPIRATION, 1750-1850, at 59-87 (1965) (same).
23. We also lack reliable information on the details of the systems categorized as involving
prosecutorial control. More modem experience demonstrates that there are nearly as many variations on
prosecutorial docketing systems as there are jurisdictions adopting that model. For example, it makes an
enormous difference in describing and evaluating the imposition of criminal justice whether a legal
system saw prosecutorial control of the docket as a ministerial duty subject to careful supervision and
ultimate review by the bench or whether it saw prosecutorial control as a discretionary power largely
immune from judicial oversight. Cataloging where states fell on that spectrum is a daunting task that
will require substantial archival research.
24. Since most southern states did not write prosecutorial control into their statutes, the evidence
for this proposition, while strong, is anecdotal. South Carolina, of course, still retains full prosecutorial
docket control. North Carolina continues to operate with a modified version of prosecutorial control and
only recently abandoned full control. See infra text accompanying notes 58-65. In many other southern
states, Twentieth-Century legislatures and rulemakers have added provisions to previously silent state
law affirmatively placing the power to control dockets in the hands of judges or court administrators.
See, e.g., FLOR. STAT. § 43.26 (adopted 1971) (giving "chief judge" of each circuit the authority "[t]o
supervise dockets and calendars"); KY. R. CIV. P. 79.03 (adopted 1976) (providing that court clerk shall
maintain trial "calendars of all actions"); KY. R. CRIM. P. 13.01 (stating that above rule applies in
criminal actions as well); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-240 (adopted 1950) (specifying that "Clerks shall
make out criminal docket" and laying out precise rules for the order of such dockets); VA. CODE ANN §
19.2-241 (adopted 1950) (giving judges power to set trial dates and summon witnesses for criminal
trials); TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 33.08 (2005) (adopted 1965) ("The district court and county
courts shall have control of their respective dockets as to the setting of criminal cases."); cf Woodall v.
Laurita, 195 S.E.2d 717, 719 (W. Va. 1973) (construing 1931 West Virginia statute ordering court clerk
to make out a "docket of cases pending" as prohibiting unilateral prosecutorial control of the court
calendar--even with the consent of the judge-because the statute "contemplates an orderly procedure
for the setting of the criminal docket, and explicitly contemplates the control of the criminal docket by
the court and not by a party litigant"). Given the experience in the Carolinas and conversations with
lawyers in some other southern states, it is likely that in most, if not all of those states, the statutes were
necessary to overturn the traditional practice of prosecutorial control. Cf State v. Simpson, 551 So. 2d
1303 (La. 1989) (striking down the traditional, albeit uncodified, practice of allowing prosecutors to
pick criminal court judges in some jurisdictions, as the practice violated due process).
25. By tradition, New York granted prosecutors the power to set the docket in most counties well
into the 1940's. See Columbia Note, supra note 8, at 613-614 ("Traditionally, calendar practice in New
York has been controlled by the prosecutor. In the metropolitan area where there are multiple part
courts, the district attorney has performed not only the function of determining when the case will be set
down for trial, but also, by means of preparing a separate trial calendar for each part, the function of
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the affirmative law of a few states in the Midwest and West,26 and the
default policy of beleaguered judges in many overtaxed urban jurisdictions
regardless of region.27 By the time law reformers began to examine the
issue of docket control in the middle of the Twentieth Century,
prosecutorial control of the docket was a common, although likely minority,
arrangement in American criminal courts.28
allocating cases among the several parts."). Massachusetts allocated prosecutors that authority by
statute. See id. at 614, n.l (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278 § 1 (1933)). Rhode Island did the same via
court decision. See id. (citing Orabona v. Linscott, 144 A. 52, 53 (1928)). Though it goes strangely
unnoticed by both the Columbia and Pennsylvania Notes, Pennsylvania also allowed prosecutors to
control the docket well into the middle of the twentieth century. See Furia, supra note 8, at 128
("Throughout the several counties of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the District Attorney's office
exercises the right to list the criminal cases for indictment before the Grand Jury, for arraignment, and
for trial. In most cases, the District Attorney determines in what order cases will be tried on a particular
day."); cf STEINBERG, supra note 14, at 82 (noting that in Philadelphia in the middle of the nineteenth
century, public prosecutor was "essentially a clerk, organizing the court calendar and presenting cases to
grand and petit juries").
26. See, e.g., Columbia Note, supra note 8, at 614, n.1 (citing WYO. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 10-822
(1945)).
27. Cf Orfield, supra note 8, at 383 ("Although the preparation of trial calendars appears to be a
court function, in state criminal cases and apparently federal as well, this function is actually exercised
by the prosecuting attorney, with practically no supervision by the court in which the action is pending.
The prosecuting attorney is not only allowed to fix the time of arraignment and trial, but in some cities
actually distributes the various cases to be tried among the different judges as he desires."). Though
Orfield speaks generally, there is reason to wonder whether he is, in fact, drawing his observations from
a balanced set of national data points. He never cites his sources, and there is some circumstantial
evidence to suggest that New York and Pennsylvania may have had a disproportionate role in shaping
his view of the operation of docketing systems nationwide (i.e., he taught at Temple University, New
York University Press published the book, all the other major published scholarship on the issue was in
New York and Pennsylvania publications, the issue was pending in the courts of New York and, to a
lesser extent, Pennsylvania at the time).
28. As noted above, see supra note 27, Orfield concludes that the preparation of trial calendars
"appears to be a court function" from reading the statute books but is "actually exercised by the
prosecuting attorney." Orfield, supra note 8, at 383-84. The author of the Columbia note half-heartedly
surveyed some of the states to determine which vested control of the docket in the prosecutor and which
vested control in the court, and found only three states that gave the power to the prosecutor by statute or
court decision. See Columbia Note, supra note 8, at 613-614, n. 1. The author of the Pennsylvania note
was even more perfunctory-listing 22 states that grant the power to the court or set it by fixed system
and only two (Massachusetts and North Carolina) that give the power to the prosecutor, but failing to
provide citations for any of those states (other than Rhode Island) or to explain what the rules might be
like in the other 26 states. See Pennsylvania Note, supra note 8, at 1072, n.99.
The above exercises in rudimentary counting grossly understate the number of jurisdictions that
provided the prosecutor with de jure or defacto authority to set criminal court calendars, as many states
allocated docketing power by court rules or custom or left the matter to the discretion of local judges.
(New York, South Carolina, and Pennsylvania being three conspicuous examples discussed thoroughly
in this article.) Moreover, to the extent that the numbers reported in these articles accurately convey the
impression that the majority of jurisdictions granted control over the docket to judges or court
administrators by the middle of the Twentieth Century, that conclusion supports either of two equally
plausible hypotheses. Perhaps prosecutorial control of the docket was always a minority practice, not
the dominant nineteenth-century regime as later commentators have tended to assume. Alternatively,
perhaps the numbers capture a snapshot of a moment in time after the pendulum had already begun to
swing back away from that arrangement. Choosing between those competing hypotheses is well beyond
the scope of this project.
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2. A Slow and Steady Trend Away from Prosecutorial Control
Sometime in the first half of the Twentieth Century, the institution
of prosecutorial control of the docket began to fade away. The precise
reasons that law reformers targeted prosecutorial control in the early to
middle part of the Twentieth Century likely differ from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction and, in any event, await further research. However, some
intriguing possibilities present themselves. First, Progressive Era reforms,
the growth of government bureaucracies, and new ideas about the scientific
management of information had combined to make it more feasible for the
judiciary to manage its own caseload. Second, the role of the public
prosecutor had completed its two-century-long transformation from neutral
judicial functionary to executive branch advocate, thereby increasing the
incongruity of prosecutorial calendar control.29  Third, the substantial
expansion in the number of judges necessary to deal with a rapidly growing
population may have undercut prosecutorial control of the docket, both by
allowing states to move away from a system of itinerant judges to one in
which judges sat exclusively in a single courtroom and by expanding the
strategic advantage prosecutors gained from controlling the criminal court
docket, leading to injustices that were readily apparent.
Initially, the decline of prosecutorial calendar control attracted very
little attention. However, in the middle of the century, some of the largest
and most influential states engaged in strenuous debate over criminal court
calendar control, and commentators briefly took notice.30 In a few law
review publications and treatises, mid-century authors described the
contemporary practice in a number of jurisdictions and discussed the pros
and cons of both prosecutorial and judicial control.3' According to these
sources, by the 1940's, most, but not all, states allocated formal control
over the criminal docket to judges.32 Nevertheless, in many (perhaps most)
of those jurisdictions, prosecutors continued to exercise de facto control,
either at the behest or with the indulgence of the judiciary. 33  The
29. See generally Goldstein, supra note 16. As a result, the fiction that the prosecutor could and
would neutrally and selflessly manage the trial docket without regard to securing the government's
advantage-always a dubious premise given human nature--collapsed under the weight of
countervailing evidence.
30. See, e.g., Columbia Note, supra note 8 (reporting on and drawing inspiration from then-
current controversy in New York state courts regarding permissibility of court rules allocating cases);
McDonald v. Goldstein, 83 N.Y.S.2d 620 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948) (rejecting prosecutor's challenge to new
court rules allocating cases for trial on the ground that, tradition aside, courts have inherent power to
control their own dockets if they so wish); Furia, supra note 8, at 128, n. I (explaining that Quarter
Sessions Court of Philadelphia had just taken over control of docketing cases where defendant was
incarcerated pretrial "at the recommendation of the author," the former clerk of that court).
31. See, e.g., Orfield, supra note 8; Columbia Note, supra note 8; Pennsylvania Note, supra note
8; Furia, supra note 8; Cornell Note, supra note 8.
32. See discussion supra note 28.
33. See Orfield, supra note 8, at 383-84 ("Although the preparation of trial calendars appears to be
a court function, in state criminal cases and apparently federal as well, this function is actually exercised
by the prosecuting attorney, with practically no supervision by the court in which the action is pending.
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commentators noted that both the formal and defacto control of prosecutors
were under attack in a number of jurisdictions and took sides in the
debate.
34
The brief flurry of attention the issue received seems to have had no
effect on the national trend away from prosecutorial control. By the 1960s,
prosecutorial control of criminal court dockets was in wide retreat through
most of the nation.35 As with many other issues, the South appears to have
been the outlier, holding on to its preexisting institutions with remarkable
tenacity. Intriguingly, the national bar and the legal academic community
appear to have been unaware or uninterested in the fact that many states in
the South continued to employ prosecutorial docket control. Once victory
was achieved in states like New York and Pennsylvania, law reformers and
academics closed up shop on the issue, neglecting to mention it in their
publications or their manifestos. One searches in vain for a single article or
treatise written during the late 1950s or 1960s that addresses the possibility
that prosecutors might control criminal court calendars, let alone the fact
that they continued to do so in a small but significant number of states.
3. The Emergence of National Standards
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a substantial number of national
organizations attempted to draft rules, model rules, or national standards for
the conduct of criminal cases. These projects-with one significant
exception-unequivocally urged that control of the criminal court docket be
vested in the court rather than the prosecutor. One provision of American
Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice, adopted in 1972, urges
that the "trial court" be given "the ultimate responsibility for proper
management of the criminal calendar," and states that judges "should take
measures to insure that cases are listed on the calendar and disposed of as
promptly as circumstances permit. 36 The Speedy Trial provision of those
standards, adopted in 1968, goes further, insisting without modification that
"[c]ontrol over the trial calendar should be vested in the court., 37  The
The prosecuting attorney is not only allowed to fix the time of arraignment and trial, but in some cities
actually distributes the various cases to be tried among the different judges as he desires.").
34. None more pointedly than Edward Furia, former clerk of Philadelphia's Court of Quarter
Sessions. See, e.g., Furia, supra note 8, at 128 ("The evils which present themselves when the District
Attorney has the power to prepare the criminal calendar are evident and become shockingly manifest
under an inefficient, procrastinating or irresponsible District Attorney.").
35. As indicated supra note 24 and infra Part II.A.3, the pace of statutory change picked up in the
1960s and early 1970s, as did the willingness of state courts to revisit the issue. New York's
transformation seems to have played some role in setting the national consensus against prosecutorial
control. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. By the time the issue was again broached-this time
by rulemaking bodies-in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the norm of court control had become so
established that few outside the South seriously considered the possibility of any other scheme.
36. American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Function
of the Trial Judge, Standard 3-8(a) (1972) (approved draft, 1972).
37. American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Speedy
Trial, Standard 1.2 (1967) (draft adopted 1968). In the second edition of this section, adopted in the
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Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, promulgated in 1974, concur, curtly
providing that "[t]he court shall provide for the assignment of cases upon
the calendar in accordance with this Rule." 38  So, too, do the standards
promulgated by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice in
1973. 39  Only the National District Attorneys' Association disagreed,
insisting, in their 1977 "National Prosecution Standards," that "[c]ontrol of
the calendar should be jointly vested in the prosecutor and the court" and
that "the prosecutor should determine the order in which cases are to be
tried." 40
The promulgation of national standards for the management of
criminal trials during the 1970s was part and parcel of a larger effort
launched during that era to study, analyze, and organize the structure and
business of courts, particularly state trial courts. Organizations, such as the
National Center for State Courts, began to systematically track the business
of our nation's courts and offered periodic assessments and reports,
recording data and recommending reforms.41  By the late 1970s or early
1980s, the procedures and policies courts ought to use to mobilize their
resources and manage their case-flow had become a subject of academic
inquiry. Judicial control over all dockets--criminal and civil-was the
assumed starting-point for the scientific study of docket management, rather
than a subject of academic debate.42
1980s, the Commentary on the rule makes explicit the drafters' intention that "the trial court should be
vested with absolute (not merely ultimate) responsibility over the trial calendar." See Commentary,
American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justices, Standards Relating to Speedy Trial,
Standard 1.2 (2d ed.). A third edition of this standard was adopted by the ABA in 2004 and awaits
commentary. The new version significantly expands its discussion of the management of criminal trial
calendars and caseloads, inter alia, renumbering the relevant standard as 12-4.5, expanding the scope of
the court's authority (to include not only "trial calendars" but also "all other calendars on which a case
might be placed"), specifying that the court should take control of case scheduling from the very
beginning of the proceedings, and imposing affirmative obligations on courts to manage their dockets
fairly and efficiently. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL, Standard 12-4.5, (third edition, adopted 2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/ standards/speedytrial blk.html#4.5.
38. UNIFORM R. OF CRIM. P. 721(a) (1974). At that time, the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure were in accord. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 50(a) (1948) (repealed 2002). ("The district courts may
provide for placing criminal proceedings upon appropriate calendars."). Interestingly, that provision
was removed from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2002, because "[t]he Committee believed
that the sentence simply stated a truism and was no longer necessary." Note to FED. R. CRIM. P. 50. It
is hard to imagine a more pointed example of the degree to which the issue has fallen off of the national
radar screen than the advisory committee's comment.
39. NATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS, 180
(1973) ("Cases should be assigned under the supervision of the presiding judge.").
40. NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, 193
(1977).
41. To understand the sheer volume of quantitative and qualitative study performed by the
National Center for State Courts and its affiliate organizations, one need only peruse their website:
http://www.ncsconline.org.
42. That discussions of criminal court docket management start from the assumption that the
judiciary has flexibility to set its own docketing systems is obvious from nearly every significant study
of the issue. One recent study that makes this problematic assumption but is in every other way first-
rate is BRIAN J. OSTROM AND ROGER A. HANSON, EFFICIENCY, TIMELINESS, AND QUALITY: A NEW
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4. The South (and Other Outliers) Fall Into Line
In roughly the last third of the Twentieth Century, the great
majority of states that had allowed prosecutors the authority to control
criminal court dockets fell into line with the national norm and either
abandoned that practice or seriously limited the scope of prosecutorial
discretion. In Massachusetts, for example, a 1974 statute granted judges the
authority to add cases to their dockets on their "own motion.' ' 3  That
change (combined with the judges' pre-existing power to delay cases "for
cause shown") 44  shifted to the judiciary the ultimate authority for
processing cases. Similarly, in 1972, the Rhode Island Supreme Court read
the existing statutes to require judicial docket control, abandoning a
seventy-two-year-old precedent that had vested docketing authority with
prosecutors.45
Massachusetts and Rhode Island notwithstanding, most of the
reform activity during the late Twentieth Century was in the South. Some
Southern states passed statutes formally entrusting the power to set criminal
calendars to judges or clerks of the court.46 In other states, appellate courts
used their rulemaking authority to promulgate new docket management
systems that located authority in trial judges or clerks.47
PERSPECTIVE FROM NINE STATE CRIMINAL COURTS (National Center for State Courts for the National
Institute of Justice and the State Justice Institute 1999), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/
Publications/ResCasMan_ EfficiencyPub.pdf.
43. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278 § I (as amended by St.1974 c. 228, approved May 16, 1974).
44. d
45. Tate v. Howard, 296 A.2d 19, 25-26 (R.I. 1972) (holding that, prior decisions seemingly to the
contrary notwithstanding, courts rather than prosecutors have the ultimate authority to manage trial
calendars under Rhode Island law). The Court couched its decision as a clarification of existing
caselaw, see id. at 25 ("This preempting of Tate's tentative trial date give us the opportunity to put at
rest the longtime belief held by many that the Attorney General has absolute control of the criminal
calendars of this state's trial courts."), and cited some state and federal decisions that had already
chipped away at the prosecutor's authority. See id. at 25-26 (collecting cases). Nonetheless, the Court
was, in large measure, simply being polite to its predecessors; the two Rhode Island Supreme Court
precedents the Court "clarified" starkly granted prosecutors the authority to manage the criminal court
dockets. See Orabona v. Linscott, 144 A. 52, 53 (R.I. 1928) (interpreting Rhode Island Constitution to
vest in the Attorney General "control of his docket for the trial of criminal cases" and allowing him to
"try them in such order as he sees fit," subject only to Constitutional and statutory notice and speedy
trial requirements); State v. Silvius, 47 A. 888, 888 (1900) (holding similarly, albeit more ambiguously).
46. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §43.26(2) (2005) ("The chief judge of the circuit shall have the
power: ... (c) to supervise dockets and calendars.") (as amended in 2003) (original version identical in
substance).; TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 33.08 (2005) ("The district court and county courts
shall have control of their respective dockets as to the setting of criminal cases.") (adopted 1965).
47. See, e.g., KY. R. CIv. P. 79.03 (adopted 1976) (providing that court clerk shall maintain trial
"calendars of all actions"); KY. R. CRIM. P. 13.01 (stating that above rule applies in criminal actions as
well); MISS. RULE CRIM. P. 9.02 ("A docket of cases for trial shall be maintained by the clerk or the
court administrator. Cases set by the judge for hearing must be ready at the appointed time.") (effective
May 1, 1995). For a discussion of the efforts of South Carolina's judiciary to adopt more modest rules
regarding docket control, see infra Part II.B.2.
Without specifying details, one source from the mid-1970s lists Alabama, West Virginia,
Arkansas, Maryland, Colorado, and Delaware as jurisdictions that had recently shifted from
prosecutorial to court control. See Hugh E. Munn, Judge Denies Challenge to Anders Trial Docket
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As the norm of judicial docket control became more firmly
entrenched in the national and regional judicial cultures, appellate courts
became more willing to police the behavior of prosecutors and judges in
challenges brought by criminal defendants. In states where judicial control
of the docket was well-established in the statute books, appellate judges
issued a number of decisions invalidating local practices that ran counter to
the letter or spirit of the docket-control statutes. In one early example, the
Supreme Court of West Virginia lambasted the system of de facto
solicitorial control that had developed in Monongalia County-cataloging a
series of wrongs that sound suspiciously like those chronicled in this Article
and, in particular, taking issue with the propriety of a "party litigant"
managing the docket.48 The Georgia Supreme Court has, in several cases,
reviewed local docket management practices that allowed prosecutors to
place cases on the calendars of particular judges and also empowered the
prosecutors to call cases for trial out of order. 49  While finding no
constitutional violation,50 the State Supreme Court found both practices
incompatible with the State's statutes and rules for docket management.5'
In yet another case, the Court of Appeals of Virginia treated as a nullity a
trial date set by a prosecutor because the relevant statute "expressly places
the control of the process under the supervision of the trial court, not a party
litigant. '' 52 Putting teeth in its ruling, the court threw out a conviction for
escape and dismissed the indictment with prejudice.53
Control, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Oct. 11, 1975, at B-I.
48. Woodall v. Lauritia, 195 S.E.2d 717, 719 (W. Va. 1973). According to the court, the former
prosecutor in Monongalia County, "did not set any motions for argument; ... failed to set cases for trial
in the order in which the defendants were indicted; ... did not set a day certain for each felony case in a
reasonable manner; and, . . . did not consult with the court and the clerk before posting the cases for
trial, all of which is required by the statute." Id.
49. The most important such case is Cuzzort v. State, 519 S.E.2d 687 (Ga. 1999) (holding that
local docket management plan that vested authority in prosecutor to set criminal court calendar violates
both UNIF. SUPERIOR COURT RULE 3.1 and GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-1). The Georgia appellate courts
have also addressed related issues in at least a half dozen other cases, most prominently State v. Wooten,
543 S.E.2d 721 (Ga. 2001) (reversing lower court decision that had overturned a conviction because it
was entered through an illegal prosecution-controlled docket system after finding that the docket
system-while illegal-did not rise to the level of a due process violation); Miners v. State, 550 S.E.2d
725 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that district attorney's failure to follow docketing system in calling
defendant's case to trial did not constitute reversible error because it was unlikely to have affected
accuracy of verdict).
50. See, e.g., Wooten, 543 S.E.2d at 721.
51. See Cuzzort, 519 S.E.2d at 688-89.
52. Williams v. Commonwealth, 347 S.E.2d 146, 148 (Va. Ct. App. 1986). But see Bishop v.
State, 482 So.2d 1322, 1324 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (holding that prosecutorial involvement in setting
of criminal court calendars does not raise significant constitutional or statutory issues as long as court
retains ultimate authority over calendar).
53. Williams, 317 S.W.2d at 148-49. The issue in the case was whether petitioner was entitled to
dismissal under Virginia's Speedy Trial Act or whether a portion of the delay was attributable to his
lawyer's decision to seek a continuance of an ostensible trial date set by the prosecutor. Id. at 147-48.
The court concluded that the trial date was nothing more than an attempt to harass the defendant, did not
give the defense sufficient warning, and was-in any event-of no legal effect because it was set by the
prosecutor rather than the court as required by Virginia law. Id. at 148.
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The Supreme Court of Louisiana acted even more boldly, striking
down aspects of the State's docket control system on federal constitutional
grounds. In State v. Simpson, the court found unconstitutional one district's
practice of allowing prosecutors to choose the judge to preside over a their
cases.5 4  Stating that "fundamental fairness" requires "a fair trial in a fair
tribunal," the Court held that, in order "[t]o meet due process requirements,
capital and other felony cases must be allotted for trial to the various
divisions of the court, or to judges assigned criminal court duty, on a
random or rotating basis."55  Sensing perhaps that the local prosecutors
needed firm guidance on how to proceed in a world where the playing field
had been leveled, the court further emphasized that, under Louisiana law,
the trial judge once assigned "has ultimate control over the scheduling of
criminal cases for trial. 56  Finally, while the prosecutor may (under court
supervision) maintain a significant role in setting cases for trial, once a
day's roster is set, "due process" requires that prosecutors take up the cases
in the order listed.57
The North Carolina story is a complex amalgam of judicial
decisions and statutory reform. 8 Up until the late 1990s, North Carolina
maintained a system similar to-though slightly more moderate-than that
of its neighbor to the south. Prosecutors had full statutory authority to set
the criminal court calendar, subject only to notice and specificity
requirements, while judges apparently had final say as to which cases from
the day's list were actually called for trial.59  (In many locales, judges
apparently abdicated this authority to prosecutors, creating a system that
was in practice roughly equivalent to South Carolina's.) During the 1970s,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted habeas
relief to a petitioner who suffered a particularly egregious manipulation of
54. 551 So. 2d 1303 (La. 1989).
55. Id. at 1304. The argument that there is a constitutional right to a randomly assigned judge has
not fared well when others have attempted to borrow it. See, e.g., Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 439-42
(7th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing Simpson in habeas corpus challenge by the boxer Mike Tyson to Indiana
system where each trial judge is assigned to a particular grand jury and prosecutor is allowed to select
grand jury to whom he wishes to present case, thereby also selecting the judge); United States v. Forbes,
150 F. Supp. 2d 672, 681-84 (D.N.J. 2001) (distinguishing Simpson in case where federal judge was
assigned white collar criminal case because of his prior handling of a related civil action); Simeon v.
Hardin, 451 S.E.2d 858, 870-71 (N.C. 1994) (distinguishing Simpson in facial challenge to North
Carolina's docket control regime); but cf United States v. Pearson, 204 F.3d 1243, 1257 (10th Cir.
2000) (opining that "if the assignment of a case to an individual judge should not be based on 'the desire
to influence the outcome of the proceedings,' then allowing a prosecutor to perform that task raises
substantial due process concerns," but declining to definitively resolve the question due to the case's
procedural posture (quoting Cruz v. Abbate, 812 F.2d 571, 574 (9th Cir. 1987)). For the purposes of full
disclosure, the author notes that, while in private practice, he worked briefly on unrelated motions for
one of the defendants in the Forbes case.
56. Simpson, 551 So. 2dat 1304.
57. Id. at 1305.
58. The story of reform in North Carolina is told well and succinctly in Rubin, supra note 6.
59. The relevant pre-reform statutory provisions are laid out, among other places, in the text of the
state supreme court's decision in Simeon v. Hardin, 451 S.E.2d 858, 868-70 (N.C. 1994).
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his case and a particularly unsympathetic trial judge. 60  Criticism of the
docketing system mounted, but the system limped on unchanged. In 1992,
criminal defendants from one county challenged the State's docketing
regime in a class action suit.61 Though the State Supreme Court found the
docketing statutes constitutional on their face, 62 it held that the plaintiffs'
allegations (which echo those raised in Part III of this Article) 63 were
sufficient to raise a claim that "the statutes which grant the district attorney
the calendaring authority are being applied in an unconstitutional manner"
in the relevant county.64
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court decision in that case, the
various interested groups began negotiating a new system of docket
management for the North Carolina courts. Though it took nearly five
years, a compromise statutory scheme was eventually enacted and took
effect on January 1, 2000. Pursuant to the new scheme, prosecutors
continue to retain the authority to set criminal court calendars, but the duty
is much more administrative. The statute requires that cases be docketed
according to a "local case docketing plan" developed by the district attorney
after consultation with judges and defense counsel. Cases must, in the
ordinary course, be called in the order listed. Most importantly, the statute
requires that initial trial dates for all felonies must be set by the court at an
administrative "setting" and does not permit prosecutors to add cases
unilaterally to that list.
65
5. Current Practice
With the exception of South Carolina, every state with a formal
policy on the issue now vests the ultimate authority to manage criminal
court dockets in the judiciary-be it the trial judge, an administrative judge,
or the clerk of court. As the above pages indicate, however, the
implementation of this consensus differs from state to state. In many
jurisdictions, prosecutors are barred by state law or tradition from having
any role in shaping the trial calendar beyond the say normally accorded to a
60. Shirley v. North Carolina, 528 F.2d 819 (4th Cir. 1975) (reversing conviction under Due
Process Clause when state delayed trial for 16 months then called case on a day when it knew
indispensable defense witness was unavailable).
61. See Simeon, 451 S.E.2d at 862.
62. See id. at 869-71.
63. The complaint alleged that the district attorney held defendants in jail in order to coerce them
into pleading guilty, repeatedly listed cases with no intention of calling them for trial thereby forcing
defense counsel to do unnecessary and repetitive case preparation, failed to call cases on agreed upon
dates even when defense witnesses had been flown in at considerable expense, used control of the
docket to punish disfavored defense counsel and to extract pretrial punishment, and listed an exorbitant
number of cases on trial lists in order to avoid giving genuine notice to defense counsel as to when cases
would be called. Id. at 862-63 (laying out claims of named defendants); id. at 871-72 (laying out in
more detail the complaint's central allegations).
64. Id. at 872.
65. The new scheme is carefully explained in Rubin, supra note 6. The new statute is N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-49.4, which was created by N.C. SESS. LAWS 1999-428 (S292).
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party in any litigation. In other areas, however, prosecutors play a bigger
role, sometimes even retaining the right and responsibility to prepare the
calendar as an initial matter. Conversations with criminal lawyers and
academics from across the nation suggest that-whatever the formal rules
in place in any given locale-prosecutors have been fairly adept at
amassing and defending peculiar powers to participate in or otherwise exert
their control over the allocation and management of cases. As one North
Carolina academic suggested, "[s]imply passing a law does not always
change the culture in an institution. 66
There also appears to be a great deal of variety in the ways in which
the judiciary manages criminal dockets. Though the subject is largely
beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that locales are divided
between a "master calendar" system that lists all cases on a single docket
and distributes them among judges for various proceedings based on day-
to-day availability and the preferred "individual calendar" system in which
cases are distributed to individual judges promptly upon arrest or
indictment and the judges are responsible for managing their own dockets.6 7
Locales are also divided between systems that process cases in the order
that they arrive and systems that employ some form of "differential case
management," adopting rules of priority based on characteristics such as
severity, complexity, and whether the defendant is incarcerated. 68  These
docketing regime decisions-like the choice of whether to give prosecutors
or courts ultimate control-have consequences for the quality of justice and
the likelihood of wrongful convictions.
B. The South Carolina Story
1. The Back Story
In many ways, the history of prosecutorial docket control in South
Carolina tracks the national story. Throughout most of the Nineteenth and
Twentieth Centuries, South Carolina's elected solicitors controlled the court
dockets in their respective jurisdictions69 as a matter of custom and
66. E-mail from James C. Drennan, Professor, Institute of Government, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, to W. Greg Flowers, February 3, 2005 (on file with author).
67. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Ostrom and Hanson, supra note 42, especially at
51-52.
68. For one of the many publications that explains and extolls the virtues of differential case
management, see Maureen Solomon & Holly Bakke, Case Differentiation: An Approach to
Individualized Case Management, 73 JUDICATURE 719 (1989). For an article extolling differential case
management as a tool for the South Carolina criminal courts and defending its compatibility with
prosecutorial docket control, see Tommy Pope and Kevin Brackett, DCM: Bringing Order to Chaos,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAWYER (March 2001), available at http://www.scbar.org/pdf/SCL/Mar0l/pope.pdf.
69. South Carolina has sixteen elected solicitors, each with responsibility for one judicial
"circuit." A judicial circuit is, in turn, made up of between two and five counties. See S.C. CODE ANN.
14-5-610 (1976). Serious criminal cases are heard in the circuit court of the county where the crime took
place. Since solicitors are elected by judicial circuit but cases are heard in county courts, each solicitor
has responsibility for maintaining the docket in multiple counties.
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tradition. 70  Though the history of solicitorial control is shrouded in some
degree of mystery, conventional wisdom suggests that the practice gained
acceptance as a response to the realities of circuit riding, itself a common
practice in Nineteenth Century South Carolina. 71  By the early part of the
Nineteenth Century at the latest, the practice was firmly entrenched and
largely unchallenged, despite the absence of any statutory or constitutional
authorization. It was simply a background reality of South Carolina's
system of criminal adjudication.
For most of the Twentieth Century, the State's courts were rarely
asked to speak to issues related to prosecutorial docket control. When
asked, however, the courts quickly and succinctly reinforced prosecutorial
prerogative. In one 1971 case, the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected
an appeal challenging the failure to accord a continuance to a criminal
defendant that, inter alia, argued the defendant was entitled to the
continuance because his case had been called ahead of more than 70 older
cases listed in front of it on the county's master criminal docket.72 In
rejecting the challenge, the Court opined that "the solicitor has the authority
to call cases in such order and in such manner as will facilitate the efficient
administration of his official duties, subject to the overall broad supervision
of the trial judge. 73  Six years later, the same court made it clear that
solicitors had little cause to worry about "the overall broad supervision of
the trial judge" when it overturned a trial judge's dismissal of two criminal
charges that had been repeatedly scheduled for trial by the solicitor's office
but not called.74 According to the court, the decision whether or not to
dismiss a case pretrial lies entirely in the hands of the solicitor and the
solicitor has full discretion to delay a scheduled case at any moment before
the case has been formally called for trial.75
In 1975, the Richland County (Columbia) Public Defender's Office
70. Until 1980, no legislation governed the issue of docket control. Moreover, state courts would
only speak to the issue under the rarest of circumstances. For what appears to be the full set of state
Supreme Court cases addressing the issue, see State v. Ridge, 236 S.E.2d 401 (S.C. 1997); State v.
Mikell, 185 S.E.2d 814 (S.C. 1971); State v. Charles, 190 S.E.2d 466 (S.C. 1937).
71. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with David Bruck (October 21, 2004) (conveying South
Carolina criminal defense bar's supposition that the practice of solicitorial control is a vestigal
institution that owes its history to nineteenth-century circuit-riding). It should be noted that solicitorial
control of the docket is not the only vestige of the circuit-riding past that shapes South Carolina's
contemporary judicial system. Prosecutors are still elected by "judicial circuit," and trial judges fill slots
designated either for a particular circuit or "at-large." More importantly, judges are assigned to
particular courthouses for "terms" that last only one week. Some judges sit in the same courthouse week
after week (often including a Chief Administrative Judge for each county, usually appointed for a one-
year period), while others move from county to county, both within and outside their nominal judicial
circuit, according to schedules promulgated by the Chief Justice of the State Supreme Court
approximately a year in advance. In an era of modem transportation and communications, circuit-riding
barely resembles the nineteenth-century practice. Still, in a technical sense, it survives in South Carolina
to this day.
72. State v. Mikell, 185 S.E.2d 814 (S.C. 1971).
73. Id. at 816-17.
74. State v. Ridge, 236 S.E.2d 401 (S.C. 1977).
75. Id. at 402.
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and a substantial portion of the private bar (led by Civil Rights veteran and
future United States District Judge Matthew J. Perry) made a motion before
the County's Chief Administrative Judge asking him to set a criminal trial
calendar of his own with the assistance of the clerk of court.7 6 The lawyers
argued that nothing in the State's law and rules precluded such an action
and that considerations of justice and efficiency militated in its favor."
Rejecting suggestions that the court's inherent powers were sufficient
authority for such an order in the absence of a statute to the contrary, the
judge expressed sympathy for the petitioners' substantive arguments, but
determined that he was powerless to grant them relief.7 8  In a state where
custom and tradition are treated reverentially, it surprised no one that a local
trial judge was hesitant to upend such a consistently followed practice, even
when faced with compelling arguments and an emerging national consensus
against the traditional practice.
2. The Courts and the Legislature Struggle for Supremacy
By the late 1970s, the winds of court reform that were sweeping the
nation had reached South Carolina.79  The South Carolina legislature was
engaged in a complicated and contentious process of court unification and
re-organization that drastically reworked the State's trial courts and
created-after much protest and fumbling-an intermediate appellate
court. 80  Both within and outside the court system, important players were
dedicating substantial amounts of time to reevaluating and redrafting
various codes of rules and procedures. It was a time where many issues,
76. See Hugh E. Munn, Control Over Trial Docket Challenged: Motion Filed Against Anders,
THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), October 7, 1975, at B-I; Anne Marshall, Solicitor Criticizes Petition, THE
COLUMBIA RECORD, October 7, 1975, at 1-B.
77. See Munn, supra note 76. The motion relied, inter alia, on the degree to which the system left
defense counsel under-prepared for trial, the inherent unfairness of one party controlling the course of
litigation, and a-recently published report of the American Bar Association's Commissions on Standards
of Judicial Administration. See id
78. See Munn, supra note 47, at B-I ("[Judge John] Grimball declared [the idea] 'has much
merit,' but the judge turned down the request, saying he doesn't have the authority to issue such an
order."). It is worth noting that in arguing the motion, defense lawyers stressed the recent abandonment
of prosecutorial docket control in other states. See id. (citing Alabama, West Virginia, Arkansas,
Maryland, Colorado, and Delaware).
79. For a brief discussion of the national trends, see supra Part II.A.3-4. For a discussion of the
impact of national trends towards court reform on developments in South Carolina during the 1970's,
see Barry Edmond Hambright, The South Carolina Supreme Court (1971) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of South Carolina) ch.4 (bearing the title "Judicial Reform"). For an
acknowledgment of the impact of national concerns about the management of criminal trial dockets on
the efforts of the South Carolina Supreme Court during this period, see Holly Gatling, Supreme Court
Delivers Order on Indictments, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Sept. 27, 1979 , at 14-A (reporting
comments of the State's Attorney General describing a Supreme Court reform order as "another cog in
the wheel of judicial reform [that] is in keeping with U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger's
,speedy trial' mandate on federal courts").
80. The Byzantine and serpentine process through which the state debated and redebated judicial
reform during this period is desperately in need of a new chronicler. The best existing source is
Hambright, supra note 79.
AM. J. CRiM. L.
long thought settled, were on the table.
If South Carolina had followed the national course, prosecutorial
docket control might well have been eliminated or drastically curtailed as
part and parcel of this wave of reform. And, at first, events moved in that
direction. On September 26, 1979, the South Carolina Supreme Court
promulgated a new "administrative rule" for the State's circuit (trial)
courts. 8' According to the new rule, solicitors had 90 days after they
received an arrest warrant from the clerk of court to either prepare an
indictment for presentment to a grand jury, formally dismiss the warrant, or
make "other affirmative disposition" of the case "in writing." 82 The time
limits were subject to extension for successive 90-day periods if, on motion,
the circuit court found "good cause for such delay.,
83
While the rule would have imposed some uniformity and oversight
over solicitors and would have cabined their discretion to manage the
criminal docket in the early stages of a pending criminal case, it was hardly
earth shattering. It imposed no limits on the ability of solicitors to manage
cases once a grand jury indictment had been handed down, gave judges no
authority to call cases on their own or to dismiss indictments if the solicitor
declined to call the cases, and did not even directly empower judges to
impose sanctions on solicitors for failing to meet the timetable laid out in its
own text.
84
Nonetheless, the new rule provoked the ire of legislators and
solicitors.85  In part, opposition to the rule was motivated by a stark
preference for the traditional system of solicitorial docket control; to those
who wanted to retain prosecutorial control, the rule was an opening wedge
that might be used to leverage bigger changes in the system.86 More
importantly, however, the judicial order in this case became further fodder
for an intense and bitter rivalry between the legislature and the judiciary
over which body had the ultimate authority to craft the State's judicial rules
81. Order of the South Carolina Supreme Court Re: Rules of the Circuit Court, Rule 95 (issued
September 26, 1979) (on file with the author). For contemporary news coverage of the Order, see
Gatling, supra note 79.
82. Order of the South Carolina Supreme Court, supra note 81.
83. Order of the South Carolina Supreme Court, supra note 81.
84. The State Attorney General, a proponent of the new order, recognized these defects-
particularly the failure to specify "a remedy or punishment for noncompliance." See Gatling, supra note
79 (reporting his comments).
85. See, e.g., Hambright, supra note 79, at 204-05 (reporting opposition of one powerful
representative, now the State's Chief Justice); Douglass Mauldin, Solicitor Control of Dockets Praised,
THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), May 31, 1980, at 5-B (reporting comments of legislators and solicitors
who opposed Supreme Court's order and supported statute that codified solicitorial control).
86. Relatedly, some legislators argued that the Order violated Article V, Section 20 of the South
Carolina Constitution which created the office of solicitor and gave the legislature the authority to set
the solicitors' duties. See Hambright, supra note 79, at 205 (reporting the argument). It remains unclear
why some learned legislators believed that-in the absence of legislation to the contrary-a judicial
order requiring solicitors to proceed expeditiously in processing cases for trial would run afoul of this
general and innocuous constitutional provision.
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and procedures. To many in the legislature, the order in question was but
the latest attempt of the State's judges to accrete power that properly
belonged with the people's elected representatives.
As the annual legislative session was winding down in the spring of
1980, legislative allies and opponents of the State's judiciary reached a
compromise on the major issue dividing them-the future of the enacted
but not yet operative intermediate appellate court.88 In the waning hours of
the legislative session, the courts' chief antagonist, longtime Senate leader
L. Marion Gressette, quietly proposed-as an amendment to an unrelated
law-a new State statute that would mandate full and complete solicitorial
control of the criminal court docket.89 With almost no debate, the proposed
amendment was adopted, and the newly minted bill was rushed through
both the Senate and the House (where it was floor managed by a member
who was also an assistant solicitor in Richland County). 90 Opponents of the
bill complained to the press that few members "were aware what they were
voting on" and that the bill had been purposefully pushed through the
House during the brief absence of the one member who would have been
most likely to have informed his colleagues of the bill's contents.91
Nonetheless, when Governor Richard Riley signed the bill, solicitorial
control of the criminal court dockets became entrenched in the statutory law
of the State of South Carolina, just as it was disappearing from the statute
books and practices of other states. The provision remains unchanged to
this day.92
87. Hambright recounts this controversy though not thoroughly. See Hambright, supra note 79, at
198-205. For contemporary news coverage that makes this connection, see Douglass Mauldin, House
Votes to Reduce Circuit Judge Authority, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), May 30, 1980, at 6-D; Editorial,
Court Rebuff Bill Slides on Through, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), June 1, 1980, at 2-B.
88. See Douglass Mauldin, Compromise Reached on Appeals Court Delay, THE STATE
(Columbia, S.C.), May 30, 1980, at 6-D.
89. See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 87 (reporting events). The statutory text is reproduced supra
note 1.
90. See, e.g., Mauldin, supra note 87 (reporting events). The official Journals of the State Senate
and the State House confirm the absence of any debate. See, e.g., JOURNAL OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA
SENATE (1979), at 1892-93 (presentation of amendment); JOURNAL OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA SENATE
(1979), at 1896 (approval of the amendment); JOURNAL OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA HOUSE (1979), at
3360 (approval by the House of the bill with the Senate amendments); JOURNAL OF THE SOUTH
CAROLINA HOUSE (1979), at 3363 (point of order challenging action rebuffed); JOURNAL OF THE SOUTH
CAROLINA HOUSE (1979), at 3394 (formally ratifying the Act).
91. Mauldin, supra note 87.
92. Even with the passage of the statute, the battle between the legislature and the courts did not
immediately abate. Just three years later, the State Supreme Court issued another administrative order
seeking to impose limits on prosecutorial docketing authority, this time relying specifically on its
authority under the Separation of Powers Clause of the South Carolina Constitution, S.C. CONST. art. V.,
§ 4. See Order of the South Carolina Supreme Court (issued August 11, 1983) (on file with the author).
Once again the issue of concern was the length of time it was taking to dispose of many cases. This time
the specific reaction was a new rule mandating that "each circuit court judge is to continue any and all
criminal matters which have been pending for a period of less than 180 days from arrest until such time
as there are no cases exceeding 180 days from the date of arrest pending and awaiting trial." Id. Though
the order was reiterated in another order dated January 13, 1984, see Order of the South Carolina
Supreme Court (issued January 13, 1984) (on file with the author) and was referenced as still binding in
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3. Contemporary Case Management Experiments
Since 1980, there have been periodic efforts to amend South
Carolina law to transfer control of the criminal docket from solicitors to
judges, usually to the Chief Administrative Judge for each county. One
such bill is currently pending.93  While such bills reflect the continued
existence of opposition to the State's now-anomalous docketing system,
they have never been able to gain any traction. To the contrary, the idea
that prosecutors' control of the criminal docket is natural and inevitable has
become deeply entrenched in South Carolina's political culture. Candidates
for high judicial office are routinely required to pledge fealty to solicitorial
control in language that has almost become ritualistic.94
The commitment of legislators and judges to prosecutorial control
has not, however, prevented the State from experimenting with modem
docket control mechanisms, including institutional arrangements that in the
abstract threaten to clip off a portion of the discretion now reserved to
solicitors. In particular, several judicial circuits have experimented with
pilot programs that structure the pretrial process into several "appearance"
dates.95 Under the theory of the program, defendants arrested in a particular
month will have a first appearance that is largely administrative on a
specified date, a second appearance on one of several preset dates (tracked
onto a particular date based on the severity of the crime and the complexity
another order three years later, see Order of the South Carolina Supreme Court (issued October 6, 1987)
(on file with the author) (hereinafter "1987 Order"), adherence to its dictates never gained traction.
What became of the order is something of a mystery-while several lawyers interviewed for this piece
remember the order being rescinded, I have been unable to identify any records to confirm that fact. At
most, the order remains on the books only as a dead letter.
It should be further noted that the order of October 6, 1987 contains language that might be read to
strip control of the docket from solicitors and hand it to each circuit's chief administrative judge. See
1987 Order, supra ("It is ordered that the administrative authority of the Chief Administrative Judges of
the circuit courts to set and amend dockets for terms of circuit court shall be exclusive. Dockets may not
be amended without prior approval by the Chief Administrative Judge .... "). However, the remainder
of the order strongly suggests that it was intended only to protect the authority of the Chief
Administrative Judge vis-A-vis other judges hearing cases in his circuit and was not intended to disturb
the division of powers between the solicitors and the bench. See id. (imposing limits on the power of
"presiding judges" to issue continuances without the approval of the Chief Administrative Judge).
Moreover, even if the order was intended to strip solicitors of some authority, it has not had that effect.
Finally, if so interpreted, the order would conflict with the statutory provision cited above and, as such,
would ultimately require a determination from the state's courts that the statutory provision
unconstitutionally encroaches on the powers of those courts. There currently seems little prospect of
such a ruling.
93. S.280, 115th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2005).
94. See, e.g., Chief Justice Jean H. Toal, State of the Judiciary 2003, 2003 SOUTH CAROLINA
HOUSE JOURNAL, at 1103 (February 26, 2003) ("I strongly support the control of the docket by our
circuit solicitors."); Chief Justice Jean H. Toal, State of the Judiciary 2002, 2002 SOUTH CAROLINA
HOUSE JOURNAL, at 1323 (March 6, 2002), ("I support continued control by the solicitors of South
Carolina of the management of criminal dockets in our state.").
95. The program was launched most extensively in Richland County, though it has spread to other
counties. The Chief Justice has been effusive in her praise of the program and, in particular, of Fifth
Circuit Solicitor Barney Giese's voluntary participation and efforts. See, e.g., 2003 SOUTH CAROLINA
HOUSE JOURNAL, at 1103; 2002 SOUTH CAROLINA HOUSE JOURNAL, at 1323.
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of the case), and a third appearance for trial or plea on a date set at the
second appearance. Though adoption of such an "appearance"-based
system by solicitors has thus far been voluntary, the program has been
designed, promoted, and monitored by an "ad hoc Criminal Docketing
Committee" chaired by the State's Chief Justice.96
This appearance system bears a striking resemblance to the
compromise system enacted in North Carolina as a result of the clamor
against pure prosecutorial docket control.9 7 If the system succeeds in
bringing predictability and structure to the criminal scheduling process, if
solicitors treat the new rules as harbingers of a new era of cooperative
docket management rather than a series of strictures to manipulate and
avoid, if the holes in the system are filled in and enforcement mechanisms
are tightened, and if the system spreads either voluntarily or by statute
across the State, then the first years of the Twenty-First Century might
eventually come to be recognized as the moment when the State of South
Carolina shifted away from a system of pure prosecutorial docket control.
But those are a lot of "ifs."
Moreover, the initial evidence from the trenches is discouraging.
Buttressed by the Chief Justice's repeated assertion that these pilot
programs are not meant to threaten prosecutorial control 98 and, in any event,
protected by the clear text of the relevant statute, prosecutors have clung
tenaciously to their prerogatives and have resisted many-though not all-
of the judiciary's efforts to rationalize the docketing process. 99 Judges,
dependent on the legislature for reelection'00 and, in any case, acting
without statutory authorization, have been cautious not to step on the toes of
prosecutors. As a result, less has changed in the relevant counties than one
might expect from perusing the Chief Justice's glowing reports.
Prosecutors treat the dates scheduled for third appearances as advisory,
letting matters pass those dates without notice to the defense or the court
and calling other cases on those days without explanation. Judges have
little formal power to impose litigation sanctions for failure to adhere to the
scheduled dates and largely decline to use their powers of moral suasion to
that end. More importantly, once cases pass their track end date (the
scheduled third appearance)-as most of them do-prosecutors recapture
even the modicum of power that they had abdicated to the court and retain
96. In addition to the annual state of the judiciary addresses, cited supra note 94, see also SOUTH
CAROLINA JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2000-2001, at 36 (identifying and naming
the Committee).
97. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 94.
99. Reports from attorneys practicing in the counties following the plan indicate that solicitors'
offices have stopped calling defendants in for unnecessary appearances at least until the tracks have run
out, have with significant exceptions largely stopped calling cases for trial before the date set for third
appearances, and have sometimes been willing to give earlier notice of what cases they actually plan to
call on a given day when pressed by the Chief Administrative Judge. See Interviews with Anonymous
Attorneys from Richland County, in Columbia, S.C. (November 2004-April 2005) (on file with author).
100. See infra Part IV.B.
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full discretion to schedule trials, pleas, and court appearances as they see fit.
As one can see, the story of solicitorial control of the docket in
South Carolina continues to unfold. That being the case, the Parts that
follow are persistently in danger of becoming stale, inaccurate, or
anachronistic. If events come to pass that relegate pure prosecutorial docket
control to the scrapheap of South Carolina history, my hope is that the Parts
that follow will serve as a snapshot of a moment in time where the efficient
and equitable administration of justice in some American states depended
on the kindness of prosecutors.
III. Prosecutorial Docketing Authority and Wrongful Convictions
South Carolina's practice of vesting docketing authority in its
solicitors is certainly anomalous. However, mere variation in the
structuring of a judicial system should not-in and of itself-set off
normative alarm bells. It is at least theoretically possible that the other
states were too quick to abandon prosecutorial docket control.
Alternatively, perhaps South Carolina faces unique challenges in the
administration of justice that require greater solicitorial input than in other
states. Even if neither of those theses is sustainable, perhaps solicitorial
control of the docket is a harmless vestigial structure, a curious reluctance
to abandon a past practice whose reasons for existing have long since
passed but has few consequences beyond its tendency to exacerbate
stereotypes of South Carolina as a backwards-looking state.
In this article, I have neither the space nor the appropriate audience
for a contextualized debate about the reasons for and the wisdom of South
Carolina's decision to retain-indeed entrench-prosecutorial docket
control in the face of a persistent and now unanimous national trend to the
contrary. Instead, this Part lays some of the necessary groundwork for that
discussion by detailing in an anecdotal but fairly systematic way the
potential negative consequences of prosecutorial docket control, with a
particular eye on the ways in which such a system has a tendency to
produce wrongful convictions.
I begin with a word about method. The scenarios sketched out
below are not reportage-I make no representation that the potential abuses
I catalog are the norm in any South Carolina county (let alone in the State
as a whole) and no effort to cite to particular cases where such abuses have
occurred. On the other hand, this Part is not the result (or perhaps I should
say: is not solely the result) of idle academic speculation. My knowledge of
the theoretical problems posed by solicitorial docket control are informed
by my observations of the actual operation of that institution in South
Carolina over the last four years and by countless conversations with
criminal defense attorneys throughout the State.l01
101. For several reasons, I am comfortable with a method that describes the potential
ramifications of prosecutorial docket control in a detailed but abstract (and largely uncited) way. First,
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In the remainder of this Part, I sketch out four ways in which
control of the docket gives South Carolina prosecutors an opportunity to
influence the quality of justice dispensed in the South Carolina courts. As
human ingenuity knows few bounds in its quest for competitive advantage,
the situations described here are archetypal rather than exhaustive. What
jumps out of each of these anecdotes is the degree to which a single
background structure-in the abstract, nothing more than a procedural
rule--can predispose a criminal justice system towards wrongful
convictions.
A. Cases That Go to Trial: Ensuring Systematically Underprepared Trial
Counsel and Other Strategic Manipulations
1. The Potential Ills
Perhaps the most obvious danger associated with prosecutorial
control of the criminal court calendar is the fear that prosecutors will use
their scheduling power to ensure that cases will come to trial at a time and
in a manner that is particularly disadvantageous to defendants. There are
innumerable ways in which prosecutors can use their control of the docket
to gain a strategic advantage.
For example, prosecutors in multi-judge locales can use their power
over scheduling cases to bring matters before judges who are likely to be
particularly sympathetic to the prosecution or particularly hostile to the
defendant. Though the need to spread work among all the sitting judges
serves as something of a check on this authority, the variety of a criminal
though the situations I depict are abstracted, they are abstracted from real events. While I am unwilling
to commit to the conclusion that these practices are the norm in any given county (let alone the State) or
that they were utilized in any given case, I am confident that each of these scenarios depicts a situation
that has occurred multiple times within the borders of South Carolina within recent memory. Second,
since our Constitutional guarantee of due process includes a commitment to structuring our institutions
(particularly judicial institutions) to limit officials' opportunities for bias and manipulation, see, e.g.,
Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60-62 (1972) (holding that Due Process Clause is violated
when initial trier of fact for traffic offenses is mayor who, due to his other duties, has an interest in
maximizing fees and fines); cf Ballard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 544 U.S. 40 (2005)
(striking down, albeit on technical grounds, tax court procedure whereby initial reports of special trial
judges were turned over to tax court judges but not made part of the record on appeal), the existence of
plausible scenarios under which unscrupulous solicitors might use their docketing power to overwhelm
the rights of criminal defendants, raises a constitutional concern, irrespective of whether those scenarios
commonly reach fruition. Cf State v. Simpson, 551 So. 2d 1303 (La. 1989) (striking down prosecutors'
ability to docket cases in front of judges of their choice because such a system on its face violates
"fundamental fairness," and hence the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Third, this,
in the end, is not an essay about South Carolina; it is an essay about the potential consequences of
prosecutorial docket control that is informed by the South Carolina experience. Commentators,
lawmakers, and judges evaluating different docketing regimes need exposure not only to data as to how
solicitorial control works in South Carolina but also to the informed theorizing and structural analysis
South Carolinians have developed through concerted engagement with this issue.
For a (much shorter) discussion of the potential ills of prosecutorial docket control that proceeds in
much the same way, see Furia, supra note 8, at 128-30. For evidence that prosecutorial control raised
similar concern in North Carolina, see supra note 63 and sources cited therein.
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court's docket provides many opportunities for manipulation. Judges who
aggressively enforce laws against physical and sexual violence, but are
skeptical about the wisdom of harsh drug laws, can be fed a steady diet of
assaults and rapes. Judges who hold police officers to a strict standard
when evaluating the constitutionality of searches and seizures can be sent
cases that do not turn on physical evidence. Judges who are generally
sympathetic to defendants at trial can be assigned lower profile cases, cases
where the prosecutors are skeptical about their own evidence and resigned
to a not guilty verdict, or cases where the evidence is overwhelming and the
statute requires a substantial minimum term (or can be held out from trial
duty altogether and asked to take pleas).10 2
Prosecutors can also manipulate the date of trial to disadvantage
defendants and defense counsel. If prosecutors want to put defense counsel
at a disadvantage, they can call complex cases shortly after counsel returns
from vacation or stack defense counsel's cases back-to-back, limiting the
time for preparation and ensuring the opposing lawyer's exhaustion. If the
defendant intends to call witnesses on his behalf, the prosecutor can
schedule the case so as to inconvenience the witnesses, hoping that they
will fail to show or will arrive surly or angry at the defendant. If the
defendant is out on bond and working or caring for children, the solicitor
can schedule the case at the moment most likely to wreak havoc on the
defendant's attempt to lead an orderly and responsible life.
Because of the limited oversight that a solicitor has in any given
case until the case is called before a judge as well as the reality that multiple
cases must be ready to go to trial on any given day, a solicitor committed to
exacting the maximum toll from a defendant (or from defense counsel) for
exercising the right to trial can use the strategies just sketched out multiple
times in a single case. A defendant may receive notice to appear for trial
one day, forcing him to take time off work, gather family members,
subpoena witnesses (both lay and expert), and confer with counsel only to
have the prosecutor decline to call the case. When, two weeks or two
months later, the defendant receives similar notice, the whole dance is
repeated, only with a crankier cast of characters. Two or three iterations of
this maneuver are often all that is needed to assure the unavailability of
witnesses or, as will be discussed in more detail below, to obtain a guilty
plea born out of frustration rather than deliberation.
102. The question whether the Due Process Clause imposes any limitations on systems in which
prosecutors influence the selection of judges is the only constitutional question broached in this article
that has been the subject of significant litigation. A number of courts have expressed sympathy for this
argument, see, for example, United States v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 1243, 1257 (10th Cir. 2000) and at least
one court has granted relief on that basis, see Simpson, 551 So. 2d at 1303 (striking down prosecutors'
ability to docket cases in front of judges of their choice because such a system on its face violates
"fundamental fairness," and hence the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also
Pearson, 203 F.3d at 1255-59 (reviewing caselaw on this and related issues and suggesting that
language in several United States Supreme Court and other appellate cases is sympathetic to this claim).
However, the majority of the courts to have addressed this Due Process issue have declined to find a
violation, at least on the facts before them. See cases cited supra note 55.
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A prosecutor who chooses to use indirection or feigned indecision
can further multiply his strategic advantage. A solicitor can informally
provide information to defense counsel as to a proposed trial date only to
change his mind and move the date forward or backward. Moving the date
forward-or calling a case without genuine notice that it was a candidate to
be called-increases the odds that trial counsel will be under-prepared.
Moving the date backward unsettles a defendant's expectations, makes it
more difficult to plan for the presence of witnesses (particularly expert
witnesses) and family members, and undermines the defendant's trust in his
attorney.10 3 As an alternative to such indirection, prosecutors can express
uncertainty about what case they are going to call until (or perhaps past) the
last legally sanctioned moment, 1°4 leaving defense counsel unsure what case
or cases to prepare while possessing that information themselves.
The tactic of crying wolf about the imminence of trial--or the
decision not to provide sufficient information as to which cases will be
called-works to deplete the energy and resolve of defense attorneys. For
better or for worse, whether by choice or scheduling pressure, most trial
lawyers operate on a cyclic work schedule in which they apply themselves
exclusively to the final stages of preparation for and the actual conduct of a
jury trial then turn their attention more diffusely to the routine maintenance
of their cases before gearing up for another monomaniacal trial cycle. If
conscientious defense counsel is led to believe that trial is imminent (or
even possible) within the next several days, that attorney may shift into trial
mode, putting aside other work matters, ignoring competing family
commitments, and generally shifting into a high adrenaline, heavy
concentration state. Defense lawyers who are maneuvered into trial mode
several weeks in a row only to see their cases uncalled often find
themselves mentally and physically exhausted and desperately behind in
managing their remaining cases. 10 5 If a defense lawyer who has been so
treated is then actually called to trial, he or she is likely to be performing at
103. Since defense lawyers often work together in public defenders' offices and, in any event,
often pool information, the decision to push back a tentatively scheduled trial has the effect of
undermining the expectations of not only the lawyer in the delayed case but also of the lawyer in
whatever case or cases are called in its stead.
104. South Carolina law requires that solicitors publish their trial dockets at least seven days in
advance. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-7-330 (2004). However, as discussed further below, many solicitors
provide weekly trial lists that contain many more cases than can be called, often without guidance as to
the order in which they will be pursued. See, e.g., Trial List for Term of Court Beginning June 27, 2005,
Richland County General Sessions Court (on file with author) (listing thirteen cases). Moreover, many
solicitor's offices publish periodic rosters of pending cases that they label "trial dockets." See, e.g.,
http://www.richlandonline.com/departments/solicitor/trialdockets.asp (last visited November 30, 2005)
(providing "trial dockets" for particular dates that often total 700 or 800 cases per week). According to
interviews with local defense counsel, the solicitors' offices that produce such "dockets" take the
position that these rosters fully satisfy the statutory notice requirement.
105. Obviously, distracting defense lawyers from the day-to-day maintenance of their cases, in
and of itself, has consequences for the equitable administration of justice and for the likelihood of
wrongful convictions.
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a sub-optimal level.10 6
Because the participants in the criminal justice system tend to be
repeat players, prosecutorial efforts to manipulate trial dates to the
disadvantage of defendants and counsel have a cumulative effect. If a
defense counsel operates in a system where prosecutors consistently utilize
the trial calendar as a strategic tool, he or she will rapidly become
acculturated to that reality and, more likely than not, adopt one of several
coping mechanisms. A certain percentage of defense counsel in such a
system will find the realities of criminal defense work in a jurisdiction with
solicitorial control of the docket untenable and opt out, whether by moving
to another locale, shifting their attention to civil work, or becoming
prosecutors themselves. 10 7 Some experienced defense lawyers who are not
driven out by prosecutorial docket control will attempt to keep themselves
in heightened trial-ready mode on a regular basis with predictable
consequences of chronic fatigue and irritability. Others will attempt to
curry favor with prosecutors in order to garner special dispensation from the
prosecutors' normally ruthless manipulation of the trial calendar, perhaps
trading information or aggression of advocacy for a more predictable work
schedule.
Faced with a system without predictable trial dates, criminal
defense lawyers are probably most likely to cope by developing a style of
practice that, in all but the most serious cases, puts off most of their trial
preparation to the last minute. Some trial preparation tasks-the weighing
of strategic options, the preparation of arguments and cross-examinations,
the research and preparation of pre-trial motions--can often be performed
adequately (though never optimally) in an artificially compressed time
frame. Other tasks, such as the identification and location of witnesses, the
service of subpoenas to ensure their presence, and the development of
expert testimony, often cannot be accomplished overnight or over a
weekend, leaving defense counsel with the Hobson's Choice of spending
their precious personal capital with judges to seek continuances or
106. A prosecutor who maneuvers defense counsel into several false trial preparation cycles in
order to tire him out for a real trial is like the proverbial professional athlete who manipulates his rival
into staying out carousing into the wee hours the night before the big game. While those stories have a
certain raffish charm when told in the context of competitive games, they take on a more sinister cast in
the context of criminal trials.
107. I presume that the percentage of defense counsel pushed out by solicitorial docket control
who otherwise would remain members of the criminal bar is additive to the already high proportion of
lawyers who "bum out" and leave criminal defense practice relatively quickly due to other factors. For
an interesting article about the phenomena of "public defender burnout," see Abbe Smith, Too Much
Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life and Fractured Ego of the Empathic, Heroic Public
Defender, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1203 (2004). It is certainly possible, however, that prosecutorial
control of the docket bums defense lawyers out faster but does not measurably increase the overall
burnout rate. Alternatively, it is at least theoretically possible that the factors contributing to the burnout
of defense lawyers (especially public defenders) are so over-determined that the additional frustration of
solicitorial docket control has only a marginal impact. The effect of prosecutorial docket control on the
career patterns of defense counsel is one of many aspects of the phenomena that is ripe for empirical
research.
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proceeding to trial underprepared and unarmed. 10 8 Last minute preparation
also may mean less opportunity to confer with a defendant about strategic
and factual issues, leading directly to some trial errors and creating distrust
between client and lawyer that further erodes the efficacy of representation.
2. Opportunities to Mitigate These Ills and Their Effect on Wrongful
Convictions
The ability of prosecutors to manipulate trial dates to their strategic
advantage has fairly obvious consequences for "wrongful convictions,"
however one conceptualizes that term. 109 For those whose definition of
wrongful conviction focuses narrowly on the question of factual innocence,
the most troubling aspect of calendar manipulation is that it systematically
brings defendants to court with cases that are under-investigated and under-
prepared, thereby increasing the chance that an innocent person will be
convicted. 10 For those who conceptualize wrongful convictions more
108. Speaking of Hobson's Choices, defense counsel who have alleged trial dates lined up days or
weeks in advance may be faced with the dilemma of whether to instruct or subpoena potential witnesses
to appear on that date if the likelihood of trial appears slim. Failure to do so has the potential to
drastically undercut a client's case. On the other hand, repeatedly noticing witnesses to appear on the
off chance that a trial might be called is a sure recipe for encouraging ill will, recalcitrance, and absent
witnesses. If the witnesses are repeat players (law enforcement officers, experts, etc.), the ill will
engendered may also spill over to the lawyers' other clients.
109. For the popular press and many in academia, the phrase "wrongful convictions" has become
almost synonymous with vindicated or verifiable claims of actual innocence. A persistent minority of
the academic community-of which I consider myself a member-continues to insist on a broader
understanding of "wrongful convictions." See, e.g., Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals,
Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 1317, 1346 n.92
(1997) ("Actual innocence means what it says-the defendant did not commit the crime of which he has
been convicted. Wrongfully-convicted defendants may or may not be actually innocent; their defining
characteristic is that their convictions were secured as a result of a material legal error."); Daniel S.
Medwed, Actual Innocents: Considerations in Selecting Cases for a New Innocence Project, 81 NEB. L.
REv. 1097, 1104-05 & n.24 (2003) (explaining difference between general claim of "wrongful
conviction" and claim of factual innocence and noting that new Innocence Projects have a difficult
choice to make in determining whether to limit themselves to the latter). Throughout this Part, I will
address the ramifications of potential abuses of prosecutorial docket control not only for those who are
actually innocent, but also for those who might be convicted as a result of the violation of a
constitutional right or as a consequence of a fumdamentally unfair trial or pretrial procedure.
110. In 2004, The State, South Carolina's leading daily newspaper, ran a series of articles on the
causes of and solutions to wrongful convictions, treating that term as synonymous with conviction of the
innocent. See Rick Brundrett, Questions of Innocence: Sometimes The Bad Guy Isn't the One Doing
Time, THE STATE (Columbia, SC), July 4, 2004, at Al; Rick Brundrett, Advocates Back Inmate, THE
STATE (Columbia, SC), July 4, 2004, at Al; Rick Brundrett, Race Often an Issue in Wrongful
Convictions, THE STATE (Columbia, SC), July 4, 2004, at Al1; Rick Brundrett, Lawyers Aim to Fix
South Carolina Justice's Mistakes, THE STATE (Columbia, SC), July 6, 2004, at A6; Rick Brundrett,
Exonerated Man's Freedom Shortlived, THE STATE (Columbia, SC), July 6, 2004, at Al; Rick
Brundrett, Preventing Wrongful Convictions: Who They Are/What They Said, THE STATE (Columbia,
SC), July 6, 2004, at Al (hereinafter Preventing Wrongful Convictions); Editorial, McMaster Should
Order Changes to Protect the Innocent, THE STATE (Columbia, SC), July 20, 2004, at A6. In its item on
potential fixes, it listed "eliminat[ing] solicitors' control of the trial docket." Preventing Wrongful
Convictions, supra, at A6. In explanation, the author quoted the Executive Director of the South
Carolina chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, Denyse Williams, arguing that prosecutorial
docket control "force[s] people to take pleas they ordinarily wouldn't take or force[s] people to trial
AM. J. CRIM. L. [Vol. 32:3
broadly so as to include convictions obtained through procedures that
violate the constitutional rights of criminal defendants regardless of guilt or
innocence, the manipulation of trial calendars to thwart a defendant's fair
ability to present evidence in his defense rings a number of constitutional
warning bells.11 For those who view the subject of wrongful convictions as
a more general attempt to identify and eliminate rules, procedures, and
patterns of governmental conduct that warp our administration of justice,
prosecutorial docket control is a prototypical incarnation of their concerns.
In any given system, the degree to which prosecutorial calendar
control effectuates wrongful convictions is, at least in part, determined by
the degree to which courts police the prosecutors' abuse of their discretion.
In some systems where prosecutors have some control over the docket, the
judiciary possesses important statutory powers to check such abuses. 1 2
when they are not ready" and noting that "[wle get a lot of letters from people in pre-trial detention
(about this issue)." Id. Her concerns were echoed by a researcher for the National Center for State
Courts. See id. (quoting Kenneth Pankey to the effect that research has demonstrated that "judges are
better managers of criminal court dockets than prosecutors"). Prosecutors quoted in the article
expressed surprise that the issue was even raised and denied any connection between solicitorial control
and wrongful convictions. See id. (quoting Barney Giese, Solicitor for the Fifth Judicial Circuit
(Richland and Kerhsaw Counties) and President of the S.C. Solicitors Association as saying that "he is
not aware of any serious complaints in his office about the scheduling of trials"); id. (quoting Greg
Hembree, the elected solicitor for another circuit, as saying that "he doesn't know of a case a judge
forced to trial when a defense lawyer was asking for more time to prepare"). The three defense lawyers
quoted loudly about other reforms are notably silent on the issue of docket control, perhaps reflecting
their ambivalence, but more likely reflecting their understanding that the issue is a third-rail that defense
counsel question at great peril to themselves and their clients.
11. As will be discussed infra Part IV, prosecutorial docket control raises serious issues under at
least three federal constitutional provisions. First, prosecutorial decisions to delay the resolution of
particular cases for strategic advantage or to jump newer cases over older cases on the trial docket for no
apparent reason present at least superficially appealing claims under the Speedy Trial Clause, U.S.
CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial."). Second, objections to many aspects of the prosecutorial control regime-such as
concerns over a party litigant picking its own judge or worries about the state purposefully holding
defendants in jail so as to coerce a plea to a crime for which the state understands it lacks sufficient
evidence-resonate with the core concerns of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, Due Process Cl. ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law..."). Finally, the cumulative effects of operating under a system
of complete prosecutorial docket control raise questions about whether criminal defendants in certain
South Carolina counties are receiving adequate assistance of counsel as required by the federal
Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing a defendant "the Assistance of Counsel for his
Defense"); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that Sixth Amendment is not
satisfied by provision of "inadequate assistance of counsel"). Perhaps the most interesting doctrinal
question raised by prosecutorial docket control is whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is
violated if prosecutors manage their criminal calendar so as to intentionally interfere with the
relationship between criminal lawyers and their clients even if the substance of the representation is not
constitutionally deficient.
So as not to mislead, it must be emphasized at the outset that existing constitutional doctrine
imposes substantial hurdles for each of these claims, see Part IV.C. infra, and that the majority of Courts
that have addressed related claims have not found constitutional violations, see, e.g., cases cited supra
note 102.
112. For a discussion on the systems now in place in two such states, Massachusetts and North
Carolina, see supra note 5. For a discussion of pilot programs in some South Carolina counties that
voluntarily cede similar powers to administrative judges, see supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
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Even when state law provides judges with little ammunition, constitutional
guarantees of adequate notice and a speedy trial theoretically cabin the
ability of prosecutors to manipulate trial dates." 
3
If the South Carolina experience is any guide, however, those
protections have little practical power to combat docket manipulation. For
example, prosecutors can easily retain their discretion to manage trial
dockets to their strategic advantage while meeting statutory and
constitutional notice requirements by substantially over-noticing cases for
any given trial date or term.' 14 Though this practice may itself be subject to
constitutional challenge in extreme situations, 15 it is remarkably difficult to
claim that a defendant does not have proper notice that her case will be
called for trial when she is holding in her hands a properly executed legal
document informing her of just that fact.
Similarly, the requirement that defendants receive a "speedy trial"
is difficult to enforce in a system where judges do not systematically
manage their own dockets. Under such a system, the most judges can do is
play a backstop role, setting an immovable final date after which a case
might be dismissed under the Speedy Trial Clause.1 6 Ex ante, the prospect
that in any one case a judge might a year or two down the road draw a line
in the sand is likely to have, at most, a trivial effect on the prosecutor's
management of that case, let alone his entire caseload. The prosecutor still
maintains the authority to call the case at the most advantageous time and in
the most disruptive way during the long window allowed by the Speedy
113. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, Due Process Cl. ("Nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"); Cleveland Bd. of Education v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, (1985) ("An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of
life, liberty, or property 'be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of
the case."').
114. The ultimate version of this strategy-employed by some solicitors in South Carolina-is to
formally notice all pending cases of a sufficient age for trial weeks in advance, thus meeting the
statutory notice requirement. See "Trial dockets," supra note 104 (listing 600, 700, even 800 cases per
week "for trial"). Whether this "notice" is sufficient to fulfill the mandate of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause is an open question. Cf infra text accompanying note 168 (arguing
that docket manipulation that serves to thwart genuine notice violates at least the spirit of the Due
Process Clause).
115. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
116. The U.S. Constitution's speedy trial guarantee has been interpreted in a flexible manner that
often gives it little teeth. The lead case, of course, is Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). In states
with constitutional or statutory speedy trial rules that impose more specific requirements on prosecutors,
speedy trial rights would likely serve as more of a check on prosecutorial docket control. Of course,
South Carolina is the one state with full prosecutorial docket control and one of the few states without a
more specific state-law speedy trial right. See S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 14 (laying out a right to speedy trial
in exactly the same terms as in the United States Constitution); State v. Brazell, 480 S.E.2d 64, 74-77
(S.C. 1997) (indicating that scope of and test for violations of state speedy trial right is identical to that
of federal right under Barker v. Wingo); cf. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-23-90 (2004) (providing a right to
release on bond if not tried within "one term" of court and release without bond if not tried within two
terms); Ex Parte Attardo, 249 S.E. 2d 771 (S.C. 1978) (interpreting a "term" of court broadly, allowing
detention for multiple years); State v. Campbell, 288 S.E.2d 395 (S.C. 1982) (determining that right to
release after two terms is simply right to pretrial release and does not preclude continued prosecution).
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Trial Clause.
Though law provides little impediment to prosecutorial
manipulation of the court calendar, culture and pragmatism may fare a bit
better as checks on prosecutors. Prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges
must learn to coexist in a system where all are overburdened. Aggressive
manipulation of the calendar by a prosecutor has adverse consequences for
that solicitor's ability to perform his duties that must be balanced against
the strategic advantages gained. Egregious manipulation of the docket runs
the risk of embarrassing and expensive reversals of convictions, perhaps on
due process or ineffective assistance of counsel grounds. More directly,
prosecutors who persistently antagonize defense counsel run the risk of
losing the cooperation of those lawyers in scheduling pleas. Similarly,
prosecutors who antagonize trial judges run the risk of adverse substantive
and procedural rulings, uncomfortable court room dynamics, and lenient
sentences. While judges lack substantial power to control the court
calendar, they do have the ability to use their residual powers to frustrate
the prosecutors' scheduling design, for example, through the granting of
continuances and motions to dismiss for discovery or speedy trial violations
or through the simple determination not to take the bench on a given day.
If, out of a sense of justice or efficiency or the desire to seek vengeance on
a disfavored prosecutor, an administrative judge takes a substantial interest
in his court's trial calendar, the consequences of prosecutorial resistance
may be too high a price to pay for prosecutorial independence. For these
reasons, enlightened self-interest may serve to moderate the worst excesses
of solicitorial control.
B. Cases That Plead: Increasing the Risks of Waiting for Trial
1. The Potential Ills
With little effort, prosecutorial docket control can be used to
manipulate a plea out of a defendant who would otherwise exercise her
right to trial. If a defendant is incarcerated pending the resolution of her
case, often all the prosecutor need do is wait the defendant out, declining
politely to move on her case.' 17 A prosecutor who has convinced the
defendant that he or she may never see the inside of a courtroom has
obtained a substantial amount of psychological control. Some defendants
may break and plead guilty against their own interests simply to obtain
resolution. Others may calculate, quite rationally, that they are likely to get
home more quickly if they plead guilty as charged than if they wait until the
prosecutor deigns to call the case to trial. And all defendants are likely to
be more receptive to a plea offer if that carrot is dangled after the prosecutor
117. This was one of the primary complaints in the constitutional challenge to North Carolina's
former system of prosecutorial docket control. See Simeon v. Hardin, 451 S.E.2d 858, 871-72 (N.C.
1994).
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has demonstrated his willingness to use the stick of docket control to
impose substantial pre-trial punishment.' 
18
Defendants who withstand the initial pressure to plead and see their
cases rise to the top of the trial docket may nonetheless find themselves
under a new pressure to plead on the eve of trial if the prosecutor has
manipulated the docket so as to catch defense counsel under-prepared or
defense witnesses unavailable or disinclined to help. As indicated above," 
9
even if the prosecutor has played a case straight and called it to trial in short
order and with full notice, defense counsel may still be under-prepared due
to the cumulative weight of operating in a system of absolute solicitorial
discretion or due to the bad habits and coping mechanisms encouraged by
such a system. Since the decision whether to go forward with a trial or
plead guilty often turns on close calculations of potential rewards and
punishments, a system that allows prosecutors to undercut a defense
lawyer's preparedness or a defendant's trust in her counsel even
incrementally has the potential to shift a substantial percentage of cases
from trials to pleas.
For nonincarcerated defendants, solicitors must be more patient if
they wish to utilize their docket control power to extract pleas. In many
situations, however, the power can eventually be used with a vengeance.
For example, a solicitor whose case appears weak has little incentive to
dismiss an indictment if he believes there is some chance that the defendant
might be arrested again. In such a case, a normally prudent solicitor might
simply sit on the matter, hoping that a rearrested defendant might be
convinced to dispose of the older (and weaker) case along with the newer
charges or that the defendant's rearrest might simply lessen his willingness
or that of his attorney to bring the case to trial. Similarly, a solicitor might
hold on to the case with the hope-born from experience-that the
defendant might fail to show up in court for a scheduled hearing or might
otherwise violate his bond, thereby allowing for the issuance of a bench
warrant. 20 Once such a warrant issues, the solicitor has not only the normal
strategic advantages attendant to an incarcerated defendant but also a
unique opportunity to leverage a not-yet-served bench warrant into a quick
and dirty guilty plea. Indeed, the fear that a bench-warranted defendant
might be dropped to the back of the line and forced to await the attention of
an angered solicitor and an unsympathetic judicial system might itself be
sufficient reason for a defendant charged with a relatively minor crime to
118. While prosecutors more often use control of the docket to encourage pleas, they also at times
use docket control to prevent clients from pleading guilty. See, e.g., Motion to Allow Defendant to
Plead Guilty in Front of Plea Judge as Designated by Solicitor, State v. Shumpert, Nos. 2004-GS-10-
8579, 2004-GS-10-4335-4336 (draft of June 16, 2005) (on file with author) (challenging prosecutor's
refusal to allow defendant to plead guilty as charged to indictment, where refusal allegedly motivated by
relative leniency ofjudges designated by solicitor to accept pleas for the weeks at issue).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 106-108.
120. For a discussion of the power to schedule court appearances as an important potential tool of
prosecutorial manipulation, see infra Part III.D.
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enter an initial guilty plea rather than attempt to navigate a trap-filled and
structurally unbalanced criminal justice system.
2. Opportunities to Mitigate the Ills and Their Effects on Wrongful
Convictions
Though they attract less attention and less sympathy than wrongful
convictions entered after full trials, wrongful convictions are often arrived
at through guilty pleas as well. 12  For many reasons, defendants who are
innocent of the conduct for which they are charged may nonetheless find it
rational to plead guilty rather than await a jury trial or may plead guilty out
of frustration and anxiety. Prosecutorial docket control increases nearly
every risk factor for such "false" guilty pleas: increasing the time many
defendants must wait for a resolution of their cases, obscuring full
knowledge of the cases' time horizon, reducing defense counsel's pre-trial
preparation, eroding trust between defendants and their counsel, and
increasing the incentives for defense counsel not to antagonize
prosecutors. 22  For reasons similar to those sketched above, those who
define wrongful convictions more broadly to include all cases where
defendants are convicted in violation of their constitutional rights or in
contravention of norms of fairness and decorum are also likely to be
alarmed by guilty pleas entered as the result of (or out of fear of)
prosecutorial manipulation of the criminal docket.
The few checks that exist on prosecutors' ability to manipulate the
criminal docket in cases that go to trial are largely absent in the context of
cases that plead guilty. In guilty plea cases under a system of prosecutorial
control, judges normally become involved in the matter only after the
defendant has decided to enter a plea. The scrutiny provided by the judge in
that circumstance is legendarily perfunctory. 23 Moreover, the adversarial
system is ill-equipped to bring to light inequities and rights violations
whose very effect is to cause defendants to acquiesce to prosecutorial
preferences.
121. For some of the many academic articles that discuss the reasons why those who are innocent
plead guilty in substantial numbers, see, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick, III & Reshma Saujani, Plea
Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the
Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189 (2002); Daina Borteck,, Pleas for DNA Testing: Why Lawmakers Should
Amend State Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statutes to Apply to Prisoners Who Pled Guilty, 25
CARDOZO L. REv. 1429, 1439-42 (2004).
122. See Preventing Wrongful Convictions, supra note 110 (reporting complaints of pre-trial
detainees that prosecutorial docket control forces individuals, including innocent arrestees, to plead
guilty even when they don't want to).
123. When a defendant chooses to plead guilty, the judge is required to apprise the defendant on
the record of the most important rights that he or she is waiving and to determine whether the plea is
given voluntarily. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Beyond those tasks-usually
performed in rote language and without deep probing-the judge has little power to or interest in
probing into the defendant's reasons for pleading or the wisdom of that decision. For one particularly
heated attack on this area of jurisprudence, see Julian A. Cook, III, All Aboard! The Supreme Court,
Guilty Pleas, and the Railroading of Criminal Defendants, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 863 (2004).
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The cultural factors that impose some restraints on prosecutorial
manipulation of the trial calendar cut in the other direction in plea cases.
As scholars have long understood, 24 the personal and professional interests
of defense counsel and judges are in the vast majority of cases better served
by a guilty plea than by a jury trial. A prosecutor who manipulates a
recalcitrant defendant into testifying by declining to call his case or by
orchestrating and then offering to ignore a bench warrant is likely to
encounter the gratitude of a bench that has no interest in trying the case and
the approval (albeit perhaps grudging) of an over-burdened defense lawyer.
When defendants or defense lawyers object to the use of docketing
regimes to enable guilty pleas, their substantive legal claims are likely to be
insubstantial. For example, while there is something distressing about a
prosecutor purposefully delaying the progress of a case with the hope that a
defendant will fail to fulfill the terms of his bond, once the defendant has
missed a court appearance or been charged with another offense there is
little defense counsel can say or do to challenge pretrial detention. Indeed,
a defense lawyer who raises an accusation of prosecutorial manipulation in
such circumstances will most likely come across as churlish and bring
judicial animosity down on her own head and that of her client.
C. The Absence of a Pretrial Judge: Warping Administrative Justice,
Limiting Adjudicative Justice
1. The Potential Ills
In addition to the fairly direct ways in which solicitorial docket
control may impact upon the fairness and efficacy of the criminal justice
system, such a system has indirect consequences that further threaten to
warp criminal justice. High on the list of these second-order consequences
is the damage done by the absence of an assigned judge during most of the
pretrial process.
Judges serve many functions in the modem criminal justice system.
Though a full discussion of the role of the criminal trial judge in the early
Twenty-first Century is beyond the scope of this article, 125 it is worth
emphasizing two distinct aspects of the judicial role. First, criminal trial
judges continue to serve an important adjudicative function, ruling on legal
motions, deciding evidentiary issues, instructing juries, and imposing
sentences. Second, in most systems, such judges have taken on important
124. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE
L.J. 1179 (1975); Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part 1, 76 COLUM.
L. REv. 1059 (1976).
125. This is not to say that such a discussion is not needed. In comparison with the substantial
work done on the evolving role of the civil court judge over the last quarter-century, there is a paucity of
systemic work cataloging and evaluating the various roles performed by contemporary criminal court
judges. For an interesting and important article with many tangential points of connection, see Gerard
E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2117 (1998).
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administrative functions-scheduling cases, overseeing their progress
through the system, conferring with the parties at various stages of the pre-
trial process to determine whether settlement is possible, and brokering
mutually satisfactory resolutions if one party or the other is irrationally
recalcitrant or if communication has broken down. 
126
It goes without saying that systems of pure solicitorial docket
control purposefully limit the administrative authority of judges. The
judiciary does not have the power to set cases for trial or for pleas, and, in
general, has little power to supervise the progress of cases through the
system. Moreover, under such a system, a particular judge is not formally
assigned to a case until the moment it is called to trial or for a guilty plea.
27
Hence, whatever limited supervisory powers the judiciary has over a case
during the pretrial stage rests with a general administrative judge who lacks
both familiarity with the case and a personal incentive in resolving the
matter expeditiously.
The absence of significant judicial oversight in the pretrial stage has
substantial consequences for the day-to-day management of cases.
Prosecutors (and defense counsel) have no one with ultimate responsibility
for the case looking over their shoulders to make sure that they are taking
the necessary steps to assure that the case reaches an orderly and
expeditious resolution. When plea negotiations bog down or one side is
holding out for an unreasonable offer in light of the facts and the
circumstances of the case, no neutral arbiter is available to mediate the
parties' dispute or talk sense into the recalcitrant party. When the parties
fundamentally disagree about the severity of the case or about overarching
legal issues that affect its disposition, little or no judicial guidance is
available. Given the importance of plea bargaining to modem criminal
justice, 128 defendants are particularly disadvantaged by the absence of a
supervisory judge. Criminal defendants are in essence required to
participate in an administrative criminal justice system operated by their
party-opponent rather than by a managerial judge.
Though these effects are real and important, the loss of a
managerial judge is ultimately not as consequential for the progress of
126. Cf id (discussing the increasingly administrative nature of the criminal justice system, albeit
with a focus more on prosecutors than judges).
127. In some South Carolina locales, a trial judge is informally designated a few days or even
weeks before trial. See interviews with anonymous local defense counsel, March 2004-April 2005 (on
file with author). If such a judge chooses to exercise his or her authority, he or she may consider pretrial
motions or attempt to exert influence over the parties' plea negotiations in the intervening time. Of
course, the prosecutor need not call the case in front of that judge if he becomes sufficiently frustrated
with the judge's behavior or rulings during the intervening period. This is also as good a place as any to
mention that most of the inequities discussed in this Part are absent in South Carolina's capital cases,
where prosecutors indicate their desired trial dates months in advance and judges are then appointed to
take control of the case, including scheduling and pretrial motions.
128. See, e.g., Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, supra note 124, at
1206 (reporting 1975 New York City study indicating that 96 percent of criminal convictions occur as a
result of a guilty plea); Cook, supra note 123, at 866 & n. 17 (reporting that national federal guilty plea
rate is approximately 95 percent and that in some jurisdictions it exceeds 99 percent).
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criminal cases as the lack of access to an adjudicative judge until the
morning of trial. Criminal defendants who possess powerful legal
arguments that, for example, the central evidence in their case is
inadmissible or that, even on the prosecutor's theory of the case, they are
not guilty of the charged offense as a matter of law have no opportunity to
raise these issues for prompt pretrial resolution. Nor do they even have the
ability to gauge the judicial winds on these questions more informally.
Instead, to obtain judicial guidance as to the merits of their legal arguments,
they are forced to invoke repeatedly their intention to take the case to trial,
to lose the benefit of any plea offer or other informal consideration that
comes with a plea, to provoke the ire of the prosecutor (and perhaps of an
administrative judge), and to wait an indeterminate amount of time before
the solicitor calls the case for trial. Many-perhaps most--defendants with
credible legal issues that might preclude either prosecution or conviction
find it prudent to plead guilty and avoid this gauntlet without ever receiving
an adjudication of the merits of their legal claims.
Those that choose to push forward to the day of trial to obtain
judicial resolution often encounter a judge who is both expecting a trial and
unfamiliar with the case. These factors make it both more likely that a
defendant will lose such a motion and more likely that he will be taken to
task or punished if he chooses to plead guilty after losing the motion. While
efficiency arguments arguably predispose judges to grant motions to
exclude evidence or dismiss charges that are made in advance of trial
preparation, such concerns oftentimes cut the other way if the motion is not
argued until the parties are fully prepared for trial. Once the full cast of
characters are gathered and a trial is called, efforts to obtain dismissal or
quash important evidence often appear stale or contrived, even though
resolution of such motions at an earlier date was likely impossible. If the
defendant does lose the motion and decides to plead guilty, it is difficult for
the judge not to take into consideration in sentencing the expense and
inconvenience of bringing the case to the edge of trial, despite the fact that
the defendant played no part in structuring the system so as to delay the
resolution of the crucial pretrial motion until those expenses and
inconveniences have been incurred.
At least in some locales in South Carolina, one of the consequences
of scheduling pretrial motions for the morning of trial is the creation of an
ad hoc legal culture that conceptualizes substantive legal motions as part
and parcel of oral trial practice and disdains or disallows written motion
practice. In a world where "pretrial" is a phase of a criminal trial occurring
between jury selection and opening statements, it is little wonder that even
substantial legal issues (such as the legality of a search, the sufficiency of
an indictment, or the resolution of double jeopardy concerns) are often
resolved through off-the-cuff argumentation akin to that which might
accompany an evidentiary objection. Even if a defense attorney has
sufficient warning of the arrival of a trial date to brief a particularly
important legal issue, the trial judge will have little or no familiarity with
2005]
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the facts and a minute timeframe in which to assimilate the relevant issues,
absorb the legal argument, call for a response from the other side, and
review the relevant authorities. Under such circumstances, professionalism
often comes across as pedantry, thoroughness as grandiosity.
For several decades, astute observers of the contemporary
American criminal justice system have observed that whether an accused
rule-breaker receives a criminal sanction (and the severity of that sanction)
is determined through a process in which rules of law-both substantive
and procedural-play only a small and ever-decreasing role.
129
Prosecutorial docket control exacerbates that trend by limiting the sphere of
adjudication to the day of the trial and by creating an environment on that
day whereby thorough and reasoned legal argument is disrespected and
discouraged. Perversely, however, the defendant whose access to
adjudicative justice is foreclosed is pushed back not into a judge-driven
system of administrative justice where the full weight of the system is
brought to bear on both prosecutors and defense counsel in an attempt to
achieve just and expeditious resolution of their cases but instead into a
prosecutor-directed system of administrative justice where docket control is
a potent prosecutorial weapon.
2. Opportunities to Mitigate the Ills and Their Effects on Wrongful
Convictions
The absence of pretrial judicial oversight and the limited nature of
motions practice in a system of pure prosecutorial docket control plays to
some of the fears of those who are particularly concerned with the
conviction of the innocent. For example, the inability to fully brief
complicated legal arguments about the admissibility of evidence reduces the
possibility that courts will fully understand and dispassionately consider
motions to exclude the kinds of evidence that correlate with wrongful
convictions, such as identifications or purported confessions obtained
through suggestive or coercive procedures. 130  Indeed, to the extent that
experienced lawyers determine that a regime of prosecutorial docket control
like South Carolina's creates a criminal justice system that does not provide
129. One classic in this vein, albeit one that makes the argument indirectly, is William J. Stuntz,
The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L. J. 1 (1997)
(arguing, inter alia, that the presence of a substantial body of constitutional criminal procedural rules
provokes institutional responses by legislators, police departments, and prosecutors that have more to do
with resolution of particular criminal cases than the rules themselves). For a more recent piece that
makes this claim more succinctly and more directly, see Douglas Husak, Is the Criminal Law
Important?, I OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 261 (2003).
130. The literature on the causes of wrongful convictions is immense and growing by the day.
Despite the volume of commentary, the analysis is strikingly consistent-bad lawyering, bad science,
flawed interrogation procedures, police and prosecutorial misconduct, unreliable jail house testimony,
and, especially, erroneous eyewitness testimony (often arrived at through flawed identification
protocols) are the primary causes for the conviction of the innocent. For one study among many, see
THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, CAUSES AND REMEDIES OF WRONGFUL CONvIcTIONS,
http://www.innocenceproject.com/causes/index.php (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
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a sufficient opportunity to challenge such evidence, they are forced to
advise clients facing such evidence to consider entering guilty pleas, their
claims of innocence notwithstanding. In turn, the failure of such clients to
preserve their legal claims further impoverishes the State's already sparse
legal literature, delaying the system's recognition of wrongful conviction
warning signs that have already seeped their way into the legal
consciousness of other states.
Those who conceptualize wrongful convictions more broadly-in
particular those who connect "wrongful conviction" with the deprivation of
a constitutional right-are likely to take special offense at a system that is
designed so as to foreclose careful consideration of possible violations of
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments' evidence-gathering limitations.13'
At least as a first order calculation, police and prosecutorial overreaching is
likely to be encouraged by a system which ratchets up the cost of obtaining
a judicial hearing on the constitutionality of the evidence-gathering in a
given case.
The potential pitfalls associated with the absence of a pretrial judge
are perhaps the most easily mediated of the dangers addressed in this
Article. While a system of complete prosecutorial docket control like South
Carolina's protects prosecutorial prerogative to delay the assignment of
cases until the very last moment, it does not, on its face, prevent the
judiciary from more actively overseeing the progress of cases during the
months leading up to trial. In particular, Chief Administrative Judges (or
their equivalent in other jurisdictions) can use their general supervisory
powers to prod prosecutors to bring cases to trial, to mediate plea disputes,
and to actively monitor compliance with discovery obligations. 132 With a
bit more controversy, they may also be able to entertain pretrial motions to
dismiss indictments as legally defective or substantively insufficient, to
exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution, or to authorize
the introduction of controversial expert testimony. While those kinds of
motions are normally left to the discretion of a trial judge, their resolution
by an administrative judge might be necessary in situations where the
orderly administration of justice requires earlier or fuller attention to the
issue than can be provided by the trial judge.' 33
131. But see Stuntz, supra note 129, at 44-45 (arguing that focus on constitutional criminal
procedure might divert attention of criminal defense lawyers from innocence-related investigation and
argumentation). If Stuntz is correct, it is at least theoretically possible that a system of prosecutorial
control that devalues Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment motions might redirect energies in ways that
reduce the number of innocent convictees.
132. This is especially true in jurisdictions where judges are empowered to hold administrative
"appearances" or "settings" to manage the flow of cases. For a discussion of North Carolina's adoption
of the administrative "setting" system as a statutory compromise, see supra note 65 and accompanying
text. For the voluntary adoption of a similar "appearance" system in some South Carolina counties, see
supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
133. Some examples might be when the motion is likely to succeed and dispose of the case, when
the motion is likely to fail and by so doing facilitate a plea, when the motion is so complex that it
requires substantial judicial scrutiny to evaluate, or when the motion is for the admissibility of expert
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To the extent that judicial assertiveness is an answer to the problem
of the absent pretrial judge, cultural and pragmatic factors potentially stand
in the way. Administrative judges have an understandable desire to avoid
stepping on the toes of their fellow trial judges. Further, confrontations
with prosecutors are unpleasant and threaten to be counter-productive in a
system designed to give the prosecutors so much control over court
administration. Finally, the advantages gained by moving more quickly to
resolve important motions is undercut by the efficiency cost of getting
multiple judges up to speed on the facts of a particular case. Though none
of these factors are insurmountable, taken together, they go a long way in
explaining why a system where judges are not selected until the eve of trial
might still reserve for the trial judge those decisions that rationally ought to
have been made weeks or months beforehand.
D. The Excessive Noticing of Court Appearances: Surveillance,
Harassment, and a Second Bite at Pretrial Incarceration
1. The Potential Ills
In virtually every criminal court system, defendants who are free on
bond must agree to appear for all properly ordered court hearings and
appearances during the pendency of their charges. 34  While this rule is
reasonable on its face-particularly when administered with appropriate
flexibility by a judge sensitive to the complexities of human existence-it
presents substantial opportunities for manipulation and harassment in a
system where prosecutors have complete control over the scheduling of
defendants' court appearances. In a system of pure solicitorial docket
control, a prosecutor can list a defendant's case for resolution repeatedly-
thereby requiring his persistent presence in the courtroom-without any
intention of actually calling the case.'
35
Such a tactic serves many prosecutorial goals. First, and most
legitimately, it assures the defendant's continuing presence in the
jurisdiction and continued awareness that charges are pending. More
troublingly, though, if a defendant is holding fast to a trial demand, it
increases the personal and professional costs of waiting for trial, thereby
shifting a percentage of cases into the plea column out of calculation or
frustration. 136  In so doing, it also serves as a warning to lawyers and
testimony and the expert is too busy or expensive to retain unless the issue is resolved substantially in
advance of trial.
134. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-53-70 (2004) ("If a defendant fails to appear at a court
proceeding to which he has been summoned, the court must issue a bench warrant for the defendant.").
135. Depending on the particular administrative procedures of the jurisdiction, it is even possible
that a solicitor might be able to send legally binding notice requiring a defendant to appear without
listing his or her case for any formal court proceeding.
136. One reason such a tool is effective is that it can be utilized in a carefully calibrated manner.
An individual might be called in and sent promptly home one week, called in and made to sit for the
bulk of a day another, and then called in and not released for several days in a third week. The ability to
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criminal defendants as to the potential costs of antagonizing prosecutors
(through recalcitrance in plea negotiations, aggressive pretrial litigation, or
some other such "sin"); like most good weapons it need only be rolled out
on occasion to serve a deterrent function. Most disturbing, the repeated
listing of extra cases for court appearances serves a docket management
function, as a predictable percentage of defendants will miss any given
court date, thereby forfeiting bond and/or provoking a bench warrant. 
137
The reductio ad absurdum of this tactic is the process of "roll-
calling": scheduling all bond defendants with pending charges to appear in
court on a given day to announce their continued availability and, perhaps,
to confer with prosecutors as to the disposition of their cases. 138 Even in the
absence of a blanket roll-call, prosecutors have a strong incentive to use
their scheduling power to bring into the courthouse in any given week a
substantial percentage of defendants facing old charges. Since, in a system
of pure prosecutorial control, there is no requirement that prosecutors
proceed with any particular case on any given day, it is simply a no-lose
proposition for prosecutors to fill the courthouse with bond clients.
Requiring a defendant's appearance has many potential positive outcomes
for a prosecutor-the defendant may fail to show and be bench warranted,
the defendant may agree to plead that day for convenience's sake, the
defendant may confer with his lawyer and become more realistic about the
potential outcome of his case, and so on. On the other hand, there is little
risk associated with this potential reward. Nor is there even a significant
efficiency cost-if the prosecutor is too busy or tired to deal with the case,
he can simply send the defendant home, without prejudice, to recall him the
next week or even the next day.In a culture of prosecutorial docket control,
the incentive structure is so stacked towards excessive noticing of bond
ratchet up pressure is a defining characteristic of any system designed to break the human will.
137. Under South Carolina law, there remains a substantial unresolved issue as to the scope of
judges' authority to issue bench warrants when a defendant fails to appear. The relevant statute
specifies that,"[i]f a defendant fails to appear at a court proceeding to which he has been summoned, the
court must issue a bench warrant for the defendant." S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-53-70 (2004). The statute is
silent, however, as to what constitutes a "court proceeding." If a defendant is summoned to court merely
because the solicitor wants to ascertain his continued availability or because the solicitor wants the
defendant to confer with his counsel in the hopes that a plea can be worked out, is the summons in
contemplation of a "court proceeding"? Similarly, is it an act of bad faith that vitiates a bench warrant if
the solicitor puts a case on a trial list with no intention of calling it, but then formally calls the case and
seeks a bench warrant only after the defendant fails to appear?
138. Repeated massive roll calls are the stuff of legend in many South Carolina counties. The
appearance system that has been rolled out in some South Carolina counties, see supra notes 95-96 and
accompanying text, was motivated to some extent by a desire to limit court appearances to those
necessary for the progress of the case. While I have elsewhere expressed skepticism about the
appearance system, see supra text accompanying notes 99-100, it has, according to all reports, been very
successful in reducing the frequency of mass roll calls and, in general, in limiting the number of court
appearances defendants must make before their cases are resolved. (On the other hand, once a case
goes beyond its track, prosecutors do reclaim the power to call defendants in on a whim and even to
undertake full roll calls.) For evidence that, while they do not necessarily call them in, prosecutors
continue to list hundred of clients for "trial" each week, even in counties which have adopted an
appearance system, see "Trial Dockets," supra note 104; see also supra note 114 (discussing related
issues).
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defendants that even the most fair-minded prosecutors are likely to
succumb to the temptation.
2. Opportunities to Mitigate the Ills and Their Effects on Wrongful
Convictions
The excessive noticing of defendants for court appearances in a
system of prosecutorial docket control is one of many factors that might
make it more likely that factually innocent defendants will plead guilty out
of frustration or calculation. 139  Beyond that real but likely marginal
effect, 40 this aspect of the system is much more likely to offend those who
are worried about structural inequities and the dignity of criminal
defendants than those whose focus is more directly on factual innocence.
Put slightly differently, the harms implicit in the excessive noticing of
defendants for court appearances are largely intrinsic rather than
instrumental. The process wears down their resolve and depletes their free
will, detracts from and demeans their attempts to live autonomous lives,
form family ties, and engage in meaningful work, and forces them to live
under the constant threat of substantial pretrial punishment even though a
judge has already determined that they do not fall into the narrow category
of individuals for whom bail may be denied. In a system where there are no
limits on the ability of prosecutors to call a bond defendant into court, a
criminal indictment itself sentences a defendant to live by the will of
another. The dehumanization that is at the heart of modem criminal
sanctions begins early.
141
To the credit of legal authorities in South Carolina and the other
jurisdictions where prosecutorial docket control had a long run or continues
to retain a toe-hold, few judges or legislators are comfortable with a system
139. See also supra Part I1.B (discussing some of the other ways in which a system of
prosecutorial docket control might manipulate defendants-even innocent defendants-into pleading
guilty).
140. The effect is likely marginal because prosecutors, particularly prosecutors in a system of
prosecutorial docket control, already have so many ways to push a defendant to plead guilty that a few
unnecessary court appearances may well seem like only an additional drop in the bucket of frustration.
Moreover, a factually innocent client is probably somewhat more likely to continue in her unwillingness
to plead even in the face of such tactics than a guilty defendant. Finally, since this tactic is by definition
reserved for defendants on bond and is most effective when the effect of the defendant's plea is to
terminate the proceeding without a prison sentence (through a fine, a time served sentence, some sort of
diversionary program, or most likely probation), even if it does result in the guilty plea convictions of
some factually innocent defendants, those defendants are not likely to serve prison sentences as a result
(and thus fall outside the heartland of the concerns of many in the Innocence community).
141. For a discussion of the nature of the contemporary criminal sanctions regime that focuses on
the ways in which modem punishments purposefully dehumanize convicted criminals and then
reconstruct them as objects for our moral disapprobation, see Deborah Ahrens, Not in Front of the
Children: Prohibition on Child Custody as Civil Branding, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 737, 737-42 & n. 1-18
(2000); see also, e.g., PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 416 (Andrew von
Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 1998) ("T]he convicted offender is excluded from the moral universe
of discourse, and is made to serve merely as the object of and conduit for public messages of
denunciation.").
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that gives prosecutors untrammeled authority to call defendants into court
on a whim with little or no intention of making progress in their cases.
Substantial thought has gone into developing strategies to mitigate these
effects. The "appearance" or "setting" system that exists either voluntarily
or by statute in large swaths of both North and South Carolina is, to a large
degree, designed to deal with this issue (by mandating particular appearance
dates tied to particular legal and administrative tasks and precluding
intermediate dates). 142  Simpler reforms such as more careful judicial
scrutiny of either initial notices to appear or subsequent bench warrant
applications may also serve to separate out the wheat of legitimate court
appearances from the chaff of prosecutorial over-reaching. Ultimately, the
simple recognition that the practice of noticing defendants to appear in
court for the purpose of harassing or punishing them exceeds the norms of
professional decorum might itself be a sufficient spur to reform.
IV. The Failure to Challenge Solicitorial Docket Control in South Carolina:
Some Lessons for Systemic Reform Litigation
As I demonstrated in Part II, South Carolina's system of pure
prosecutorial docket control is not only unique among the fifty states but is
also at odds with well-established national policy norms. As I sketched out
in Part III, such a system of pure prosecutorial docket control poses a multi-
faceted threat to the fair and efficient administration of justice and likely
contributes to the forging of wrongful convictions. At first blush, those two
factors-the isolation of South Carolina from National norms and the
magnitude of the consequences chargeable to a single practice-suggest
that prosecutorial control of the docket is ripe for a constitutional challenge.
After all, if the history of systemic reform litigation tells us anything, it tells
us that those two ingredients are a potent recipe for judicial intervention.143
Moreover, once one understands the nature and scope of the
fairness concerns raised by prosecutorial docket control, several provisions
of constitutional text seem to suggest a degree of solicitude for those
arguments. For example, the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition on the
taking of "liberty" without "due process" suggests a willingness to police
142. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing North Carolina's new statutory
scheme); supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text (discussing voluntary adoption of similar scheme in
some South Carolina counties).
143. Cases where the Supreme Court has brought a few outlier states into accord with emerging
national norms far outstrip cases where the Supreme Court is at the forefront in setting such norms. For
a few high profile examples of the Supreme Court performing this "clean-up" function, see Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling earlier precedent and invalidating laws banning private same-
sex sexual activity only after the number of states with such laws had declined to under ten); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (invalidating only state statute that continued to allow death penalty for
rape of an adult woman); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating anti-miscegenation laws
only after the 14 non-southern states with such laws repealed them, isolating the southern states on this
issue).
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criminal court adjudicative procedures for systematic biases. 144 Similarly,
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a "speedy trial" suggests a willingness
to scrutinize a state's mechanisms for resolving cases when those structures
fail to resolve cases at a clip that comports with a common-sense
understanding of "speedy."' 145 Finally, the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
a "right to counsel" strongly implies that the courts are likely to be
concerned with intentional state impediments to the proper function of a
criminal defendant's relationship with his or her lawyer. 1
46
Given that frame, it is tempting to assume that the failure of the
state's criminal defense and civil rights bars to muster a concerted challenge
to the docketing statute reflects a failure of will, imagination, or initiative
among those lawyers. This temptation is buttressed by regional prejudices
that leave many outsiders dubious about the abilities of locally-trained
southern lawyers, and is further exacerbated by the largely accurate
perception that South Carolina is a relatively resource-poor state that neither
adequately funds its public defense system nor supports a substantial
privately-funded law reform or impact litigation infrastructure.
Alternatively, it is equally tempting to let the lawyers off the hook
and place the blame on the judges-both federal and state-who might
adjudicate such a lawsuit. According to this theory, the criminal defense
and public interest bars in South Carolina have been around the block
enough times to understand that such an audacious challenge to such a
traditional and ingrained element of the State's juridical culture is likely to
meet with stone-faced rejection whatever its abstract merits. Rather than
tilting at windmills in the State courts or the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, those lawyers have dedicated themselves to the
zealous representation of their clients within the confines of the system or
to other less controversial law reform goals.
While I see kernels of truth in each of these explanations, 147 both, in
the end, are too simplistic. The South Carolina Bar is replete with lawyers
who have earned national reputations for their criminal law savvy, and the
State has, in just the last few years, been home to a number of nationally
significant constitutional cases. 148 Further, while the courts of the State and
region certainly look like a hostile forum for the litigation of a
constitutional challenge to solicitorial control of the criminal docket, legal
challenges to docket control procedures have won success in other
144. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
145. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
146. Id.
147. South Carolina does have a poverty of litigation resources in comparison with the great
majority of other states and the specter of review by the famously conservative Fourth Circuit certainly
diminishes the appeal of running to federal court with a novel constitutional claim.
148. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (challenging the policy of drug-
testing pregnant women at a public hospital and turning over results to local police); Wynne v. Town of
Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2990 (2005) (challenging the town
council's policy of beginning meetings with Christian prayer).
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seemingly inhospitable states, 149 as have similar challenges to indigent
defense funding systems.'50
If the failure of South Carolina lawyers to launch a systemic reform
campaign against the State's criminal docketing system cannot be traced
either to the failings of the bar nor to the impenetrable conservatism of the
local and regional bench, where might we look for explanation? Though I
do not have any firm or final conclusions to offer on this matter, exploring
the question has lead me to identify three factors that appear to stand in the
way of successful litigation on this issue. First, the professional and moral
responsibility criminal defense counsel owe to their clients undercuts their
ability to perfect strong constitutional challenges to the State's docketing
regime. Second, the most pernicious aspects of the docketing regime only
achieve their negative consequences in combination with other troubling or
idiosyncratic features of South Carolina law. Challenges to the docketing
regime that do not fully explain these other features, therefore, run the risk
of sounding artificially flat and of leaving in place, if they succeed,
substantial portions of the structures that cause the relevant harms. Finally,
for complicated historical and theoretical reasons, the serious inequities
produced by prosecutorial control of the docket do not neatly map onto the
relevant constitutional doctrine. Fitting these claims into the existing shape
of constitutional law is an exercise in extrapolation and retailoring, rather
than one of simple application.
These factors do not mean that a lawsuit challenging prosecutorial
control of the docket in South Carolina could not succeed. To the contrary,
anyone who wished to bring such a challenge would have substantial legal
raw material with which to work and would benefit heavily from the semi-
successful challenges brought in other jurisdictions. Moreover, experience
suggests that, even if such a challenge did not succeed in the courtroom it
would have the potential to bring public attention to the issue, build
coalitions, and prod legislative change. 
1 51
What these factors do suggest, however, is that there have been-
and continue to be-reasons to be cautious when laying the groundwork
and shaping the legal claims for a possible constitutional challenge to South
Carolina Code § 1-7-330.152 More importantly, these speed bumps are not
the result of nominal factors or idiosyncrasies of South Carolina law, but
rather stem from common and very basic realities about the nature of legal
149. See, e.g., Simeon v. Hardin, 451 S.E.2d 858, 868-70 (N.C. 1994); State v. Simpson, 551 So.
2d 1303 (La. 1989).
150. See, e.g., State v. Quitman County, 807 So. 2d 401 (Miss. 2001); State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d
780 (La. 1993); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990).
151. For an important recent article that unpacks these possibilities with skill and attention to
detail, see Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L. REV. 477 (2004).
152. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-7-330 (2004) ("Preparation of the dockets for general sessions courts
shall be exclusively vested in the circuit solicitor and the solicitor shall determine the order in which
cases on the docket are called for trial. Provided, however, that no later than seven days prior to the
beginning of each term of general sessions court, the solicitor in each circuit shall prepare and publish a
docket setting forth the cases to be called for trial during the term.")
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roles, legal rules, and legal doctrine. As such, they stand as lessons-albeit
perhaps murky ones-for other law reformers contemplating challenges to
similarly overbearing practices in other jurisdictions
A. The Roles and Responsibilities of Criminal Defense Counsel
For both doctrinal and persuasive reasons, the ideal challenge to
solicitorial control of the criminal court docket would likely emerge from a
case in which a criminal defendant suffered direct and substantial prejudice
as the result of the solicitor's manipulation of the docket. 153 Though every
lawyer who has thought .about the issue seems to have a pet theory as to
exactly what kind of prejudice is most likely to get a court's attention,
popular candidates include defendants who are unable to ensure the
attendance of alibi witnesses because they are given insufficient warning as
to the trial date, defendants who are unable to procure the services of expert
witnesses for similar reasons, and defendants whose counsel are wildly
unprepared because the solicitor blatantly misled them as to the trial date or
purposely strung several of their cases back-to-back in order to wear them
down.
Though such cases likely do occur, they are few and far between,
largely because of the zealousness and adaptive ability of the criminal
defense bar. When prosecutors attempt to call cases that raise these basic
kinds of fairness concerns, most criminal defense lawyers raise their voices
in loud and persistent protest, requesting and then demanding continuances.
While lawyers seeking to bring down the system of prosecutorial docket
control face the temptation to move forward in cases where they have been
blindsided and left without crucial witnesses in order to perfect an attractive
vehicle for challenging the docketing system, their ethical responsibilities to
their clients preclude them from acting on those instincts. 154  Similarly,
when maneuvered into trying cases for which they are manifestly
unprepared, responsible trial counsel seek continuances, plead
ineffectiveness, and, if those tactics fail, move heaven and earth to prepare
themselves to provide at least adequate representation to their clients.
The irony is manifest. Defense counsel practicing in localities with
the most unscrupulous solicitors work themselves to the bone in order to
provide representation that, while constitutionally adequate, is subpar. By
going above and beyond what should reasonably be expected of them in a
desperate quest to serve the interests of their clients, these lawyers undercut
153. For a cursory discussion of some of the doctrinal considerations, see infra Part IV.C.
154. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 5, Ethical Consideration 5-1 ("The professional judgment of a lawyer should be
exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising
influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of
third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client."); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 7 ("A lawyer should represent a client
zealously within the bounds of the law.") (1980).
[Vol. 32:3
When Prosecutors Control Criminal Court Dockets
the foundation of a constitutional challenge to the docketing regime and
reinforce the very system that is causing them to provide frustratingly
mediocre representation in the first place. If the lawyer blinks, his client
suffers. If not, he suffers personally and defenders of the system gain
another data point.
In a perverse way, then, the continued vitality of a system of
prosecutorial docket control relies on the prediction that defense lawyers
will maintain fidelity to their clients and their professional roles. In a world
where defense lawyers did not owe duties of loyalty and zealous
representation to each individual client, some substantial number might put
their law reform goals (or even their personal comfort) over the interests of
particular clients and allow cases to move forward in the absence of
witnesses or without any real time for preparation. 155 If a sufficient number
of defense lawyers were to act in such a manner, the system might well
come crumbling down, buried in a series of outrages and scandals that the
courts (or the legislature or the general public) could not ignore. In the
world that exists, however, most defense lawyers do the best they can for
their clients in a system that is stacked against them ... and in so doing
toughen the task for those committed to unstacking the system.
B. Webs of Inequity
While the dangers outlined in Part III are traceable to South
Carolina's peculiar system of prosecutorial docket control, they are also
enabled by other quirks of South Carolina law and politics. To take an
example touched on above, 5 6 the dangers implicit in a prosecutor's ability
to hold off on calling trials where the evidence is weak is exacerbated by
South Carolina's failure to adopt state speedy trial rights that are more
specific or demanding than the anemic federal test. While both of these
rules-prosecutorial control over when a difficult trial will be called and the
lack of a potent speedy trial remedy-might independently wreck havoc,
the two taken together cause harms that are exponentially worse than would
be caused by either separately. Similarly, South Carolina's rule forbidding
(with limited exceptions) judicial dismissal of cases before they are called
for trial1 57 deepens the harms inflicted by prosecutorial docket control and
closes off a potentially vital safety valve.
The consequences of prosecutorial docket control are further
155. The ethical duties of criminal defense lawyers during the preparation and course of
institutional reform litigation is the subject of a minor literature. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree & Randy
Hertz, The Ethical Dilemma of Public Defenders in Impact Litigation, 14 NYU REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
23 (1986).
156. See supra note 116 and cases and statutes cited therein. To take a related example, South
Carolina is one of the few states that does not impose statutes of limitations on most criminal
prosecutions. See Alan L. Adlestein, Conflict of the Criminal Statute of Limitations with Lesser
Offenses at Trial, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 199, 250 n.223 (1995) ("South Carolina and Wyoming do
not have any such statutes.").
157. See supra note 3; supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
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buttressed by some larger structural features of South Carolina government.
To take the most prominent example, South Carolina elects all of its judges
to fixed terms (6 years for Circuit Court and Court of Appeals Judges and
10 years for Supreme Court Justices) by the vote of a joint session of the
two chambers of the State legislature. 58 The consequences of this method
of selection are predictable. Judges tend to be former State legislators or, at
the very least, individuals with strong personal connection to important
legislators. 59 During their time on the bench, judges desiring reelection
must strain to remain in the good graces of the State legislature and must
further refrain from antagonizing other political powerbrokers. As a
consequence, the bulk of judges in South Carolina are culturally indisposed
to challenge the authority of solicitors, while those who might be willing to
exert stronger oversight over prosecutors must often back down for
pragmatic reasons. 16  Thus, the structuring of South Carolina's judicial
selection process hamstrings judges in exercising their supervisory power,
the one check essential to limiting the potential for abuse implicit when one
party directs the litigation process. 161
The lack of a state speedy trial rule, the prohibition on judicial
dismissals, and the State's mechanism for selecting judges are but examples
that illustrate a broader phenomenon. The problems identifiable in South
Carolina's criminal justice system are not the product of a single rule but of
a seamless web of rules, procedures, traditions, and attitudes that together
warp the administration of criminal justice in the State. No doubt, some of
those factors weigh more heavily in the calculus than the others-if this
article is to be believed, prosecutorial docket control is at the very top of the
list-but the threads are not easy to disentangle. Reformers who target one
particular aspect of the State's laws are likely to run into confused stares
from those who, without a fuller picture, cannot fathom why a single rule is
causing so much agita and spirited disagreement from those who diagnose
the relative importance of the contributing factors differently. Moreover, if
reform is achieved on the targeted issue, the other contributing factors will
remain and, depending on their vitality, might restitch themselves into a
similar web of inequity.'
62
158. The best source on the rules for judicial selection in the various states is the American
Judicature Society. For a good compendium of information on the judicial selection methods in the
various states (including the South Carolina information cited in the text), see AMERICAN JUDICATURE
SOCIETY, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES, APPELLATE AND GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS
(2004), available at http://www.ajs.org/js/JudicialSelectionCharts.pdf. Virginia is the only other state in
the country that selects the bulk of its judges via naked legislative balloting. See id at 13.
159. Four of the five members of the South Carolina Supreme Court, five of the nine members of
the State Court of Appeals, and at least 19 circuit court judges are former legislators. See biographies
located at http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
160. Solicitors are popularly elected and tend to have substantial political bases of their own or
close alliances with powerful legislators or both.
161. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text (discussing central importance of judicial
oversight in determining whether system of prosecutorial docket control substantially increases danger
of wrongful convictions).
162. For example, there is reason to fear that if prosecutorial control of the docket were modified
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C. The Mechanisms of Doctrinal Development
At first blush, the inequities traceable to solicitorial docket control
appear to be the kinds of slights that the rights-bearing provisions of the
United States Constitution were designed to rectify.163 Indeed, when first
exposed to the stark reality of the South Carolina system, most
sophisticated constitutional thinkers are wont to assume that existing
constitutional doctrine cuts broadly enough to invalidate the offending
rule. 164  When one carefully parses the relevant caselaw, however, it
becomes clear that our collective doctrinal mind has not grappled with the
problem of prosecutorial docket control to the point of resolution.
Those searching for constitutional ammunition to challenge
prosecutorial docket control must chose among a number of candidates.
Back in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, to the extent that prosecutorial docket
control was considered a constitutional problem, it was conceptualized as
raising Speedy Trial Clause issues.165 To some extent, the fit is natural, as
the darkest nightmare for a defendant faced with solicitorial docket control
is that he will be left to rot in jail while the prosecutor declines to call the
case. Further, in the years before the Supreme Court offered a definitive
doctrinal framework for evaluating Speedy Trial Clause claims that focused
on a case by case assessment of the totality of the circumstances, 166 it was
plausible to suggest that prosecutorial docket control might on its face
implicate Speedy Trial Clause concerns.
In recent years, the little constitutional litigation over prosecutorial
docket control that has taken place has focused on the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. 167 Again, the claim has an instinctive
appeal, as the Due Process Clause is the Constitution's primary guarantor of
governmental fairness. Many of the specific complaints about prosecutorial
docket control resonate with pockets of due process doctrine. For example,
by legislation or judicial decree, judges who are comfortable with the current practices and who fear the
consequences of treading too aggressively on their reelection prospects might continue to defer to
solicitors on calendaring issues. Certainly, the lukewarm success of North Carolina's reformed system,
see supra note 65 and accompanying text, and South Carolina's similar experiments, see supra notes 95-
97 and accompanying text, suggest that merely giving a judge some modicum of additional power on
paper will not in and of itself curtail solicitorial influence.
163. See supra note Ill and text accompanying notes 144-47 for enumeration of the plausible
constitutional claims.
164. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (recounting conversations on this subject). The
reaction of those with whom I discussed the issue at the 2005 Innocence Network conference almost
exactly mimicked these discussions.
165. For evidence that docket control was once treated as a speedy trial issue, see, e.g.,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICES, STANDARDS RELATING TO
SPEEDY TRIAL, Standard 12-1.2 (1967) (draft adopted 1968) (discussing issue as part of broader analysis
of speedy trial rules); Orfield, supra note 8, at 380-85 (discussing docketing regimes in section entitled
"Right to a Speedy Trial").
166. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (laying out framework).
167. See, e.g., Simeon v. Hardin, 451 S.E.2d 858 (N.C. 1994); State v. Simpson, 551 So.2d 1303
(La. 1989); see also discussion supra notes 55 and 102 (discussing caselaw on due process right to
randomly assigned judge).
2005]
AM. J. CRIM. L.
the manipulation of trial dates raises issues of proper notice and the power
to select the trial judge raises concerns about judicial neutrality. 6 8
Finally, the degree to which prosecutorial docket control
systematically encourages under-preparation for trial and undercuts the
attorney-client relationship suggests the possibility of a Sixth Amendment
claim premised on the ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC).169 If, as the
result of State statutory law, defense counsel must navigate a series of
purposeless roadblocks and intentional stratagems in order to provide basic
legal services, the right to counsel is impaired in the most literal sense. As
one anonymous local attorney put it, in response to a particularly blatant
manipulation of the docketing scheme, "The right to counsel has to mean
more than the right to have someone with a law degree standing next to you
when you plead guilty.'
170
Despite the intuitive applicability of these constitutional provisions
to the abuses of solicitorial docket control, none of the provisions is a
perfect fit. As I suggested above, the courts have shaped the Federal
Speedy Trial Clause into a remedial backstop, imposing outer limits on the
authority of the state to delay the processing of particular cases after case-
specific evaluations of the length of the delay, the state's reasons, the
defendant's assertion of his rights, and the amount of prejudice if any. 17 1
That Clause has been granted little affirmative muscle; statutes and
practices that have a tendency to delay the diligent prosecution of cases are
not subject to ex ante challenge based on their aggregate effects but can
only be attacked peripherally as part of a general ex post challenge to the
delay in a particular criminal prosecution. 172 As a result, the Federal Speedy
Trial Clause might provide case-specific relief to the occasional individual
stonewalled for an abnormally long period of time without proper
justification, but it is unlikely to serve any significant role in a frontal
assault on prosecutorial docket control.
The jurisprudence that has developed in the arena of IAC claims is
similarly premised on a contextualized after-the-fact assessment of a
particular counsel's performance. 173  That focus presents substantial
168. Cf Cleveland Bd. ofEd. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, (1985) ("An essential principle of
due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property 'be preceded by notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case."'); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60-62
(1972) (holding that Due Process Clause requires an initial trier of fact who has no vested interest in the
outcome of the case).
169. The Sixth Amendment guarantees all criminal defendants "the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the right to
"Assistance of Counsel" carries with it a corollary right to "effective assistance of counsel." See
generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (laying out standard modem tests for
constitutional claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel).
170. Interview with Anonymous South Carolina criminal defense attorney, in Columbia, S.C.
(November 5, 2004) (on file with author).
171. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) (introducing case-specific balancing test).
172. See id.
173. For one serious recent discussion of the ramifications of structuring IAC doctrine in this
way, see Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective
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obstacles to those who might seek to mobilize IAC arguments in a
constitutional challenge to prosecutorial docket control. First, if a
successful IAC challenge is made in the context of a particular criminal
appeal or post-conviction petition, that decision will have little or no impact
on the general vitality of prosecutorial docket control even if the judge lays
substantial blame on that institution for the deficiency of representation.
Second, to the extent that defense lawyers perform their tasks adequately
despite the obstacles in their path, the fact that governmental actors took
affirmative steps to reduce the quality of representation is of little or no
constitutional moment.1 74  Finally, even in cases where prosecutorial
manipulation of the docket provokes defense counsel performance that falls
below the low bar set in Strickland v. Washington, defendants will still be
unable to obtain relief absent a demonstration that their lawyers'
performance caused sufficient prejudice to invalidate the verdict. 75
Though due process doctrine allows for broad ex ante challenges to
rules and procedures that promise systemic unfairness, due process
challenges to solicitorial control pose their own set of "fit" problems.
While the language of the Due Process Clause seems particularly
appropriate for such a challenge, due process doctrine quickly muddies the
waters. In particular, advocates attempting to structure a due process
challenge face the familiar problem of having to take a broad-based
fairness-oriented challenge to a governmental practice and shoehorn it into
either a "substantive" or a "procedural" due process box. 176  One might
Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1.
It should be noted that the text here slightly overstates the doctrine's rigidity. While ineffective
assistance of counsel claims are normally brought as after-the-fact challenges in particular criminal
cases under the rules articulated in Strickland, a handful of courts have recognized an alternative
systemic, ex ante IAC claim. See, e.g., State v. Peart, 621 So.2d 790 (La. 1993) (applying prospective
rule-based analysis to IAC claims in challenge to funding of state indigent defense services); State v.
Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990) (acting similarly). Since the wisdom of and prospects for such an
alternative IAC claim are well-developed in the scholarly literature on systemic challenges to
insufficient indigent defense funding, I simply refer you to that literature, the latest flowering of which
includes Bibas, supra; Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of
Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219 (2004); Daryl K. Brown, Essay, Rationing Criminal
Defense Entitlements: An Argument from Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801 (2004); Note,
Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent Defense Systems, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1731 (2005).
174. For more on this dilemma, see supra Part IV.A.
175. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984):
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to
require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the
defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires
showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as
the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both
showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a
breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.
176. The tracking of due process claims into "procedural" and "substantive" due process is too
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easily frame the claim as an argument that procedural due process concerns
require the use of court-driven trial scheduling procedures. Alternatively,
and with more difficulty, one might frame the issue as a substantive due
process right not to be subjected to the coercion, harassment, and undue
influence of prosecutors. Leaving aside the question of which is a better
doctrinal fit, both approaches present identical problems--each forces the
litigant to artificially limit the substance of her fairness-driven arguments
and to subject those arguments to evaluation under standards designed for
different kinds of claims. 177  The heart of the due process challenge to
prosecutorial docket control is neither the constitutional necessity of a
particular procedural protection, nor the substantive freedom from
prosecutorial coercion but the manifold unfairness of an entire system of
judicial administration. 178  While such a systemic concern seems centrally
connected to the Due Process Clause's text and tradition, it is marginalized
by modern due process doctrine.
In addition to the claim-specific doctrinal difficulties sketched
above, a constitutional challenge to prosecutorial docket control falls
between legal chairs in a number of other ways. For example, this kind of
systemic challenge to background structures of criminal adjudication does
not fit neatly into either a standard criminal appeal or post conviction
proceeding, or into a general civil injunctive action.' 79  Similarly, the
concerns raised in this article may well turn out to be neither sufficiently
universal to permit a facial challenge to the relevant South Carolina statute
nor sufficiently case-specific to be comfortably litigated in (or cured by) an
as-applied challenge.' 
80
The concerns presented in this sub-part do not mean that a
familiar a phenomenon to need a citation. For one article that manages to explain the difference while
simultaneously demonstrating that the line between substantive and procedural due process can be
blurry and arbitrary, see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Taming the Tail that Wags the Dog: Ex Post and
Ex Ante Constraints on InformalAdjudication, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1057, 1063-66 (2004).
177. For example, the standard test for whether a procedural due process violation has occurred is
the balancing test articulated in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). This test captures some of
the concerns raised by prosecutorial docket control but ultimately leaves out of the balance most of the
substantive objections to prosecutorial control (except for worries about the factual reliability of the
proceedings). See id. at 332-335 (weighing heavily in the balancing test the effect, if any, of the
proposed procedure on the likelihood of"an erroneous deprivation" of life, liberty, or property ).
178. One almost needs to coin a new due process label to capture the sense of the claim.
"Systemic" due process is reasonably accurate. "Structural" due process would be even better if it was
not already reserved by Laurence Tribe. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269 (1975) (coining the term "structural due process" and giving it a different
meaning).
179. This concern maps the long debate in the indigent defense community as to whether
challenges to funding levels are most effectively brought in the context of criminal cases or as stand-
alone civil actions. The issue is complicated by a set of tricky abstention and standing issues. See, e.g.,
Margaret H. Lemos, Civil Challenges to the Use of Low-Bid Contracts for Indigent Defense, 75 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1808, 1825-29 (2000) (discussing applicability of Younger abstention doctrine, see Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), to civil challenges to indigent defense funding).
180. Cf Simeon v. Hardin, 451 S.E.2d 858 (N.C. 1994) (rejecting a facial challenge to North
Carolina's former system of prosecutorial docket control but allowing an as-applied challenge to survive
a motion to dismiss).
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constitutional challenge to prosecutorial docket control is untenable, but
only that such a challenge requires more creative reimagination of doctrine
than one might have guessed on first blush. What jumps out of the
doctrinal analysis more than anything is the observation-startling in its
simplicity-that the failure of one generation of criminal law reformers to
keep prosecutorial docket control on the national agenda has made it more
difficult for the next generation of law reformers to find firm constitutional
footing for a challenge to that practice. In the years since lawyers last took
seriously the issue of docket control, the doctrine of each of the relevant
constitutional provisions has continued to evolve, picking up a doctrinal
superstructure that shapes our analysis of its meaning. 181 These evolving
superstructures did not develop in a vacuum, but instead were forged out of
concrete cases litigated to challenge particular practices. As such, they
reflect the concerns of the impact litigation bar and the judiciary at a
particular historical moment. Time marches on, perceptions of injustice
and litigation priorities shift, but the remnants of the old cases live on in the
doctrine-superstructures forged in one era become mediating doctrine,
subtly shifting the substantive meaning of constitutional guarantees and
making it more difficult for differently configured claims to grab the
attention of the guardians of those guarantees.
V. Conclusion
This Article was inspired by a unique and troubling feature of
South Carolina law-prosecutors' complete statutory authority to craft and
maintain the calendar of criminal cases. From that inspiration, however, it
has ranged far afield: rescuing the history of criminal docketing regimes
from the dustbin of history, unpacking some of the potential adverse
consequences for the administration of justice stemming from prosecutorial
docket control, and analyzing some of the lessons to be learned from the
absence of a concerted constitutional challenge to South Carolina's
docketing system. The unifying hope of each of these diverse parts has
been that my unique perspective-standing amidst a criminal justice system
dominated by an archaic pre-modern procedural device-provides
glimmers of insight that might be useful for those outside the state who
need to deal in more mundane ways with criminal docketing procedures or
undue prosecutorial influence or systemic reform litigation.
181. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (developing a doctrinal test for
evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims); Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)
(developing a test for procedural due process claims); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)
(developing a test for speedy trial claims).
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